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Members of both the German counterinsurgency forces and Soviet partisans 
terrorised the civilians of the occupied Soviet territories during World War II. At 
times, fighters of either force robbed, sexually assaulted and killed civilians. The 
nature of the rear-area security war was such that these actions could be treated as 
legitimate acts of war rather than wanton crimes. This thesis seeks to explain these 
crimes by exploring its preconditions. Both the German and Soviet regimes can be 
understood to have deliberately undermined the restraints that would have helped 
prevent these crimes from occurring. Judicial restraints were nullified with the war on 
the frontlines distancing itself from international law and the norms of war. 
Psychological and moral restraint was undermined with both regimes' official 
ideologies conceiving of the occupied civilians as innately criminal. Finally, a further 
aspect of judicial restraint was countered as fighters were not heavily punished for 
individualistic crimes against the civilian population. 
With these restraints removed, the overwhelming picture of the rear areas is 
one of lawlessness. Fighters from both forces of the security war had absolute 
authority over the occupied civilians and often exploited them to a horrific degree. 
Both forces can be seen as having converged against the civilian population and a full 
understanding of the occupied experience seems incomplete without recognition of 
this. This convergence also highlights similarities between Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union with both, otherwise-opposed, ideologies manifesting themselves in 
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Philosopher A. C. Grayling attests that war creates a moral space beyond the realms 
of regular human life, with otherwise reprehensible actions being committed under their 
cover.1 The atrocities committed by the German security divisions and Soviet partisan bands 
in the occupied Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945 are tragically not uncommon. Conflict 
is deeply synonymous with atrocity in our modern age. Yet it must be remembered that this 
was not always so. The conduct of the Axis invasion of the USSR would have been near 
unrecognisable as war, by the extent and pitch of its aims and violence, if observed by an 
eighteenth century visitor accustomed to inter-state conflicts between the European powers.2 
In the words of Richard Evans, Hitler’s Generalplan Ost “proposed destruction on a scale 
never before contemplated in human history.”3 The excesses of the war, being first 
perpetrated in Poland, were far beyond what had been experienced on the Western Front just a 
year earlier.  
The radicalisation of warfare was an intentional product of the central commands of 
both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The depravity of the frontlines infected the 
operational norms of those involved in the rear-area security war. German occupation forces 
and Soviet partisans warred within a place beyond morality, necessity and law. Any action 
could be inflicted on the civilian population without need, without repercussions and without 
punishment. Civilians became exploitable chattel within the domains of warlords and 
gangsters, whose regimes had engineered the destruction of any restraints that would 
otherwise curb their actions. Not only were these regimes mostly unwilling to identify where 
atrocities were committed outside of war aims, they were also simply unable to do so. The 
excesses of both the security units and the partisans were so intrinsically tied to the states that 
had armed them that individualistic crimes were wholly indistinguishable from official orders. 
For a civilian living in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, it mattered little if 
the soldiers that entered the town were from German security divisions or the Soviet 
partisans. At times, both rounded up and executed hostages, and both ensured the starvation 
and freezing of others by razing property and confiscating all food stocks. Simultaneously, 
individual acts of robbery, sexual violence and murder were inflicted on the occupied 
civilians on a daily basis. These absurdly-boundless actions made a mockery of the official 
                                                     
1 A. C. Grayling, War: An Enquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), first introduced on page 
10. 
2 Truman O. Anderson, “Germans, Ukrainians and Jews: Ethnic Politics in Heeresgebiet Süd, June-
December 1941,” War in History 7, no. 3 (2000), 326. 
3 Evans, The Third Reich At War, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), 174. 
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ideologies of both forces. Rape was one of the many offences by German security divisions 
against those that Nazi ideology would regard as Untermensch, sub-human. Soviet partisans 
similarly exploited the same civilian population that other members of the resistance believed 
they should be protecting. These were above all individualistic, opportunistic crimes under the 
guise of legitimate warfare. When the crimes of each force are compared, the overwhelming 
impression is that the forces converged against a single target: the civilian population. This 
convergence is paradoxically in spite of the radically opposed ideologies of each state, as well 
as the profoundly contrasting way that each force conceived of itself. On an individual level, 
however, members of each force seemed to share perceptions of themselves and of their 
victims that harmonised with their counterparts in the opposing force.  
Historians have considered this convergence in the past but the event requires further 
contemplation. Richard Overy encapsulates the position of the civilians when he explains that 
the partisans’ “victims were to be found not only among the German occupiers but among the 
ordinary Soviet people, who came to fear their own side almost as much as they did the 
enemy.”4 Similarly, Truman Anderson aptly details that the civilian population appeared 
“willing to obey whichever antagonist appeared most credible at a given time.”5 Kate Brown's 
A Biography of No Place ends with a discussion of the ongoing conflict between the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Soviet state between 1945 and 1953. The way 
Brown presents the post-Second World War activity is significant as it adheres to this essay’s 
conception of the rear-area security war. Brown explains: "It was an extended feud, an 
unforgiving war of attrition in which bands of NKVD special units and UPA guerrillas 
haunted the forests, terrorizing each other and the civilian population."6 In line with Brown's 
focus, Snyder's Bloodlands brilliantly characterises the civilians as caught between the two 
regimes. The security war's double-victimisation of the occupied civilians is exemplified in 
his explanation of how each force recruited from the civilian population: 
By early 1943, the people of Belarus, especially the young men, were caught in a 
deadly competition between German forces and Soviet partisans that made nonsense 
of the ideologies of both sides … For the Belarusians who ended up fighting and 
dying on one side or the other, it was very often a matter of chance, a question of who 
                                                     
4 Richard Overy, Russia's War (London: Penguin Books, 1999),143. 
5 Truman Anderson, “Incident at Baranivka: German Reprisals and the Soviet Partisan Movement in 
Ukraine, October-December 1941,” The Journal of Modern History 71, no. 3 (1999), 622. 
6 Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), 223. 
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was in the village when the Soviet partisans or the German police appeared on their 
recruiting missions, which often simply involved press-ganging the young men.7 
Snyder's thesis harmonises with the arguments of this essay. His concept of the convergence 
of the two states, rather than them paralleling one another, rightly asserts that the word 
parallel “suggests that they don't touch."8 Snyder follows Vasily Grossman in recognising that 
both Nazism and Stalinism were built on "their ability to deprive groups of human beings of 
their right to be regarded as human",9 and this victimised the millions of civilians between the 
two capitals. 
The argument here takes its start from the insights of Snyder, that discussions of 
civilian's experiences are incomplete without the concept of convergence. If a historian does 
discuss convergence, it is often not given the emphasis that it deserves, as wholly 
representative of the civilian experience. Each crime that either force committed against the 
civilians has a nearly identical counterpart committed by the other side. This is despite the 
vast differences between each force at face value. The question remains insufficiently 
explored, despite having its constituent parts well investigated by numerous historians: Why 
did this convergence occur? In attempt to answer this question, this study is to be a 
distillation, rather than a synthesis, of the event’s current historical consensus, with a renewed 
attempt to understand its implications. 
While the narrative of simultaneous victimisation tells us about the targets of 
exploitation, there is an interwoven narrative which illuminates more about the perpetrators. 
While it was the states themselves that facilitated, encouraged and rewarded crimes to be 
committed, it was individuals that had to commit them. As such, this is a study of the regimes 
that intended (or in the USSR's case, consented) to turn the conflict into an apocalyptic 
struggle. More importantly, however, this is a study of the individuals that exploited the 
lawlessness of the rear areas to their own benefit. The nature of the occupied USSR during the 
Second World War, this temporal-spatial zone, is better understood by the actions that 
individuals took on their own, without orders, rather than those actions which were directly 
insisted upon by superiors. Rather than a question of what evil can be committed under the 
command of authority, the rear-area security war suggests what evil can be committed when 
the opportunity arises.   
                                                     
7 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (London: Vintage, 2015), 243, 244. 
8 “New Views on the Holocaust and 1980s Britain” History Extra (London: Immediate Media Co. 
(BBC), October 10, 2015), http://www.historyextra.com/podcast/Holocaust-Thatcher-Britain. 
9 Snyder, Bloodlands, 387. 
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This study is a thematic history of the rear-area security war from June 1941, with the 
Axis invasion of the USSR, to late 1944. This latter date has little significance as instability 
persisted in the region well after 1945 (such as with the aforementioned UPA-USSR conflict). 
It was by 1944, however, that most occupation zones had been entirely retaken by the USSR, 
with Soviet partisans being drafted into the Red Army or assigned to what can broadly be 
defined as reconstruction, such as local law enforcement or in labour battalions. The focus 
here is on the occupied territories of the USSR, such as Reichskommissariat Ukraine and 
Reichskommissariat Ostland (Belarus and the Baltic states), as it was in this space that 
security and partisan forces most resembled one another. Other resistance movements, such as 
those in the Balkans and modern-day Poland, differed from the Soviet-German theatre enough 
to warrant a separate investigation. For one, forces like the UPA, the Armia Krajowa, or the 
Četnik movement, were fighting for the idea of a state, or a state that had been defeated. 
Although the entirety of Ukraine had been occupied, the central Soviet command was still in 
control of armies in the field, as opposed to the Polish government-in-exile.  
 Language restrictions on my own part have restricted the sources of this essay to 
English-language material. Similarly, having completed this work in Perth, Australia, has 
limited archival access to the various digital databases available for German and Soviet study. 
For the Third Reich, these databases include the Documents on German Foreign Policy series, 
particularly the incomplete Volume D, covering up to late 1941. The Harvard Law School 
Library’s Nuremberg Trials Project has also been used for its translated, digitised documents. 
Primary sources for the Soviet side have been used from the Harvard Project on the Soviet 
Social System, as well as from the collection of English-language survivor interviews in the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum online database. While the sources used from the 
latter of these databases are almost entirely from partisan members that were also Jews, the 
majority of those that contribute to this essay report no maltreatment for this. Although other 
historical works have uncovered numerous cases of partisan anti-semitism, alongside the 
USSR’s mistreatment of ethnic minorities, the interviewees that add to this essay were 
overwhelmingly considered by their peers to be partisans first and Jews second. Their 
experience can be considered as representative of the rest of their partisan band’s regardless 
of their individual demographic within them.10  
These Soviet sources also deserve special mention as they must be vetted more 
carefully than those available for the German experience. The majority of those available in 
the two aforementioned databases are memoirs and interviews by contemporary actors, 
                                                     
10 For a thorough discussion of Jewish experience in partisan bands, see Alexander Statiev, “Soviet 
Partisan Violence Against Soviet Civilians: Targeting Their Own,” Europe Asia Studies 66 no. 9 
(2014), 1537-1540. 
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recorded many years after the war. As such, these sources are only referred to when the 
validity of their content is highly probable, adheres to current scholarly consensus or 
corroborates the findings of other similar primary sources. Deviation from this rule is reserved 
for self-criticism and credence given to rival organisations. While it is more difficult to trust 
decade-old benign recollections of one’s own actions, it is more reasonable to consider 
moments of self-criticism and the rare concessions of praise of one’s past enemies as closer to 
an unedited recounting of the event.11 
 
Although we will be focusing on self-serving, opportunistic crimes, offences that 
were committed under official orders are of enormous significance as they set the tone for the 
war behind the frontlines. The highest echelons of the German and Soviet states encouraged 
the war to be fought on a deeply criminal level, where ever-intensifying savagery was to be 
accepted as the norm. The official ideologies of both the Nazi and the Stalinist systems 
conceived of the occupied civilians as punishable without evidence, as well as without guilt 
on the part of the executioner. This facet of each state's ideology had a resounding impact on 
the conduct of the rear-area security war, with both forces enjoying almost-limitless authority. 
The final piece of this study is a discussion of each force's disciplinary systems. The 
resounding conclusion is that not only did individualistic offences go unpunished, individuals 
were also able to restrain their own conduct without punishment. The forces of the security 
war were able to determine their own conduct to a great extent, and yet the exploitation of the 
civilian population was an extremely common choice. 
The historiography of both the Wehrmacht (the German armed forces) and the Soviet 
partisans has dramatically evolved since World War II. The historical narratives of both 
forces began with what can be now recognised as severe misrepresentations. These histories 
were seized by authors that wished to present a certain public face for the forces in question. 
While the messages of these first-wave histories undoubtedly remain true for a section of the 
Wehrmacht and the partisans, they certainly no longer resonate with the majority of those that 
took part in the rear-area security war. The contentions of these first histories endured for 
decades, being challenged and confronted piecemeal until receiving their virtual deathblow in 
the 1990s. The evolution of the Wehrmacht narrative began as a gradual process, requiring the 
inheritors of the Third Reich’s past, the German people, to begin to interrogate their role in 
the war. This process, known as Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the coming to terms with the 
past, began in the 1960s with a few brave individuals, and was also an outcome of the 
                                                     
11 See Alexander Brakel, “The Relationship Between Soviet Partisans and the Civilian Population in 
Belorussia Under German Occupation, 1941-4,” in War in a Twilight World, Partisan and Anti-
Partisan Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1939-1945, ed. Ben Shepherd and Juliette Pattinson (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 83. 
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Historikerstreit, the “historians’ dispute”, in the 1980s. This coming to terms with the past 
effectively climaxed with the opening of Hamburg museum exhibit, “War of Annihilation: 
Crimes of the German Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 1995.  
Meanwhile, the Soviet partisans’ narrative stagnated, held in stasis like the USSR 
itself, until the opening of the Russian archives in 1991. Soviet censoring did briefly relax at 
times, and this allowed for dialogue to begin on the true nature of USSR’s wartime conduct. 
However, these periods of questioning were brief. Despite major advances in the partisans’ 
historiography, there are still obstacles to a post-Soviet coming-to-terms-with-the-past today. 
The revelations of the both the Third Reich and the Soviet Union’s historiographies have 
failed to have their implications given the focus that they deserve, partly because of the legacy 
of their earlier historiographies. One major obstacle of these legacies appears to be the 
reluctance to conceive of both the Wehrmacht and the Soviet partisans as necessarily 
comparable. However, this comparison is vital for a satisfactory understanding of life in the 
occupied Soviet territories during World War II. By making this comparison, we settle the 
understanding of the two forces back into the same position that they were often viewed by 
those civilians that were caught between them. 
The true conduct of the Wehrmacht was intentionally obscured after the war. The 
actions of German frontline forces, as well as those involved in the rear-area 
counterinsurgency war, the Banditkampf, were romanticised for several decades. The 
Wehrmacht was portrayed as an honourable fighting force, unsullied by the atrocities that 
characterised the SS and the Nazi Party. This popular conception of the army saw the armed 
forces as an apolitical weapon, untarnished by the ideology of the fanatics that wielded it.12 
Within this framework, the counterinsurgency war in the eastern front’s rear areas was argued 
to be a just conflict against a savage, wholescale uprising.13 The post-war memoirs of 
Wehrmacht personnel were a generous contributor to this conception of the war, with a great 
host of memoirs displaying what Weinberg aptly regards as “an astonishing degree of 
ignorance, actual or pretended” of the military’s role in the Holocaust,14 in tandem with the 
atrocities of the Banditkampf. The SS were utilised as a moral scapegoat for the generation of 
Germans that had to rebuild after 1945, as well as the descendants of theirs that were 
embracing the identity of Germany as something other than Nazi. The spirit of de-
                                                     
12 Ben Shepherd, “‘Unprecedented, Merciless and Unrelenting Harshness’: Fanaticism and 
Brutilisation in Wehrmacht Anti-Partisan Warfare in the Soviet Union,” in Fanaticism and Conflict in 
the Modern Age, ed. Matthew Hughes and Gaynor Johnson (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 63. 
13 Ben Shepherd, “The Clean Wehrmacht, The War of Extermination, and Beyond,” Historical Journal 
52, no. 2 (2009), 461. 
14 Gerhard L.Weinberg, A World At Arms, A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 926. Well known Wehrmacht memoirs include Erich von Manstein’s Lost 
Victories, as well as Franz Halder’s The Halder Diaries. 
14 
Nazification in West Germany was effectively not only to remove the legacy of Nazism, but 
to replace it with a conception of Germany as a democratic ally to the West, on the frontline 
against communism. The myth of the clean Wehrmacht was indirectly fostered within this 
space, with the US government playing an active role in rehabilitation of Germany’s image.15 
The idea of the clean Wehrmacht was similarly constructed in British post-war memory, with 
a tenacious ennoblement of the Heer, the German army, through the figure of Erwin 
Rommel.16 While the image of the clean Wehrmacht does resonate with a stratum of its 
personnel, this grain of truth is vastly outweighed by the mass of contradicting cases. 
 The first stage of the Soviet partisans’ historiography shared the same hallmarks. 
Historians writing from within the Soviet Union portrayed the partisans as a state-wide 
uprising, a cohesive resistance motivated by their communist loyalties. Partisan bands were 
said to have enjoyed popular support, surviving off the devoted patronage of the occupied 
populace. The conclusions of these historians were that the partisans greatly contributed to the 
Axis’ repulsion from the USSR. The official Soviet histories politicized the partisans’ role, 
portraying them as exemplars in the fight against fascism, rather than focusing on Nazism.17 
Early Western histories of the Eastern Front either adhere to the Soviet line or wholly avoid 
the region. Many follow a Churchillian, Western-centric account of the war, prioritising 
conflict zones that the British themselves were active in. Publications such as Wilmot’s The 
Struggle for Europe,18 Calcorossi and Wint’s Total War19 and Taylor’s The Second World 
War20 discuss virtually every major European guerrilla group other than those active on the 
Eastern Front, on which they provide little detail, if any at all.  
Part of the neglect of the East was certainly that Western historians could only access 
the archives of the Western Allies. Equally powerful, however, was the reluctance of some 
writers, such as Churchill himself, to venerate what appeared to be an increasingly hostile and 
bold rival, the USSR.21 The Cold War was, in this way, both a physical and an ideological 
barrier to the progression of the Soviet partisans’ historiography. If a non-Soviet publication 
                                                     
15 See Brian C. Etheridge, “The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy and the German Question in Early 
Cold War America,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 2 (2008), 207-238 for a compelling view of US 
identity shaping in the early Cold War. 
16 See Patrick Major, “‘Our Friend Rommel’: The Wehrmacht as a ‘Worthy Enemy’ in Postwar British 
Popular Culture,” German History 26, no. 4 (2008), 520-535. 
17 Alexandra Goujon, “Memorial Narratives of WWII Partisans and Genocide in Belarus,” East 
European Politics and Societies 24, no. 1 (2010), 6. 
18 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle For Europe (New York: Harper, 1952). 
19 Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War (New 
York: Penguin, 1972). 
20 A. J. P. Taylor, The Second World War: An Illustrated History (New York: Putnam, 1975). 
21 David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War 
(London: Allen Lane, 2004), 311. 
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from this early period does cover the partisan war, the reader is at risk of simply encountering 
inaccuracies. As we are presented with in Kamenetsky’s Hitler’s Occupation of Ukraine,22 the 
nature of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is seriously misrepresented. What 
Kamenetsky does include on the Soviet partisans does remarkably adhere to the current 
historical consensus, though this is not the focus of this work and is given very little attention 
overall. Although omissions are expected in early histories, and Kamenetsky’s work is still 
noteworthy, this early publication should not be read without warning. The UPA are 
presented as purely honourable fighters without mention of the group's ideological harmony 
with Nazism, their assistance of the Einsatzgruppen (the “task forces” directed against Jews) 
killings, their exterminationist reprisals or their subsequent genocidal campaign in 1943 
Volhynia.23 Although the Ukrainian nationalist partisans are not to be a focus of this essay, 
Kametsky's 1956 publication is highly representative of the first-wave histories of the eastern 
partisan movements.  
The historiography of the Wehrmacht was increasingly challenged until its total shift 
in the 1990s. The historical methodology of Alltagsgeschichte, or everyday history, of the 
1970s and 1980s attempted to address the increasingly evident gaps in the historical 
understanding by a focus on those within the otherwise-anonymous institutions of the Reich. 
The aim of this when applied to the Wehrmacht was to investigate the extent to which 
ordinary soldiers had harmonised with Nazi ideology, and the systemic mechanisms that 
achieved this. The Historikerstreit of the 1990s represented the general acceptance of the 
complicit-Wehrmacht narrative, at least in scholarly circles. Historians that may have 
previously argued for the idea of a clean Wehrmacht had now effectively accepted the army’s 
role in the Holocaust. Their new position, however, was that the Holocaust should be seen no 
differently than the genocides perpetrated by other states in the past.24 The Historikerstreit 
can be seen as a continuation of the postwar German identity debate, struggling with the 
Holocaust’s moving historical consensus. The Historikerstreit was the last major attempt to 
salvage what Bosworth refers to as “a usable past” from the Third Reich, attempting once 
again to imbue Germany with moral distance from the Holocaust.25 The 1995 Hamburg 
                                                     
22 Ihor Kamenetsky, Hitler’s Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956). 
23 See Timothy Snyder, “The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943,” Past & Present 179 
(2003); Also, Olesya Khromeychuk, “Ukrainians in the German Armed Forces During the Second 
World War,” History 100, no. 343 (2015) for one of the topic’s leading scholars on Ukrainian 
collaboration. 
24 Omer Bartov, “Preface,” in The German Army and Genocide, Crimes Against Prisoners, Jews, and 
Other Civilians, 1939-1944, ed. The Hamburg Institute for Social Research (New York, The New 
Press, 1999), 14. 
25 R. J. B. Bosworth, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War 
1945-1990 (London: Routledge, 1999), 74. 
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exhibition, “War of Annihilation: Crimes of the German Wehrmacht, 1941-1944”, along with 
articles such as “Obedience to Murder? The Hidden War of the German Wehrmacht”, by the 
weekly newspaper Die Zeit, brought the debate into the public sphere for the first time.26  
 The official government position of several post-Soviet countries are yet to come to 
terms with their own past, intentionally obscuring further studies of the partisans. 
Government policy has guided a critical engagement with the past whenever it has occurred. 
Khrushchev's “thaw” during the 1950s and 1960s softened censorship in the interests of de-
Stalinisation. A similar phenomena occurred again under Gorbachev with perestroika and 
glasnost, “restructuring” and “openness”, during the late 1980s and 1990s. Public debate was 
opened during these periods, and the fall of the Soviet Union with the subsequent, brief 
opening of the country’s archives, allowed for serious reinterpretation of the partisans’ role.27 
However, a reintroduction of censorship hampers the partisans’ historiography in Russia 
today with recent laws against the “rehabilitation of Nazism”. Introduced in May 2014, this 
bill criminalises the dissemination of intentionally false, or on commemorative holidays, 
disrespectful information about the USSR’s conduct during the Second World War. A similar 
set of restrictions were passed in Ukraine in the same month, criminalising the defaming of 
the Ukrainian Insurrection Army.28 The ongoing task of accepting the past has a tangible 
impact on a full historical understanding, with first-hand archival material that would 
paradoxically violate these laws being closed to the public. The Russian State Archive of 
Socio-Political History (RGASPI) lists the material that is still inaccessible to the public:  
Reports on immoral partisan actions (desertion, drunkenness, plunder of the local 
population, etc.); …  Documents on the execution of civilians by partisans (Finnish 
civilians, families of traitors, etc.); … Information on the hostile attitude of the 
population towards partisans; … Documents on conflicts among the commanders of 
partisan units.29 
In light of this, historian Alexander Brakel provides a useful discussion of archival study on 
the partisan movement in his essay’s contribution to War in a Twilight World. Brakel 
convincingly recommends using the archives of the rivals of the faction that the historian 
wishes to study. For example, seeking the uncommon but revealing times that the Polish 
Armia Krajowa gave a positive assessment of the Armia Ludowa or the UPA, or similarly 
                                                     
26 Bartov, “Preface,” 14, 15. 
27 Goujon, “Memorial Narratives of WWII Partisans,” 7. 
28 See David R. Marples. “Anti-Soviet Partisans and Ukrainian Memory,” East European Politics and 
Societies 24, no. 1 (2010): 26-43; David R. Marples, “Stepan Bandera: The Resurrection of a Ukrainian 
National Hero,” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 4 (2006), 555-566 for one of the topic’s leading scholars 
on Ukraine’s politically-driven memory debate. 
29 Statiev, “Soviet Partisan Violence Against Soviet Civilians,” 1526. 
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when the Ukrainian nationalists gave a positive assessment of the Soviet partisans.30 Where it 
is possible to see through the maligning of the enemy that is expected from primary sources, 
these records can provide an illuminating insight into their rivals. Among others, the current 
governments of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia each struggle with their country’s role in the 
security war under German occupation. Having reviewed the primary source material first 
hand in order to determine what which archives were to be barred, these governments deny 
sufficient explanation to those civilians that were brutalised by the partisans under the guise 
of war. 
The German counterinsurgency campaign is now widely acknowledged to have been 
an extension of the Holocaust. Simultaneously, the tremendous crimes that many Soviet 
partisans inflicted against their own people can be recognised as similar to the tactics of the 
Germans themselves. It seems that from the perspective of the civilians caught between them, 
the two rival forces effectively converged against a common enemy: the occupied peoples. 
For the civilians caught between the two warring forces, it did not matter if it was Wehrmacht 
security divisions or Soviet partisan bands that were entering their village from one day to the 
next; the outcome was often essentially the same. The civilians were stripped of their 
possessions, suffered sexual violence, had their property destroyed and members of their 
community executed. Examining the convergence of these atrocities is not to afford the 
groups moral equivalence but practical equivalence. As Christopher Browning posits in the 
introduction of Ordinary Men, “Explaining is not excusing; understanding is not forgiving.”31 
An understanding of this convergence helps explain not only each force’s crimes, but also 
sheds extra light on the ideologies of both the Nazi and Soviet regimes, with both regimes 
being able to express themselves in the same way against the occupied civilians. 
 The first chapters of this study will cover the preconditions to the rear-area’s 
lawlessness. Chapter I will focus on the systemic influences, whereby criminality was 
deliberately set as an innate facet of the war’s conduct. The forces of the security war were 
granted judicial impunity, satisfying the most literal precondition to lawlessness. Chapter II 
will discuss each state’s effort to nullify their soldiers’ moral judgement. Just because soldiers 
have the ability to kill without punishment does not mean that they will do so. However, both 
ideology and substance abuse undermined these restraints. The final precondition to 
lawlessness will be discussed in Chapter III. This is the inability or unwillingness of each 
regime to punish their troops’ excesses. Another considerable aspect of this is that soldiers 
were not punished for restraining their own actions either, indicating that they had some 
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choice to act in moderation if they wished to do so. Once the preconditions have been traced, 
Chapter IV will highlight the outcome and extent of lawlessness. Finally, Chapter V will 




A CRIMINAL WAR: THE NEGATION OF JUDICIAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESTRAINT 
“Kriegsraeson geht vor Kreigsmanier” 
German proverb, necessity in war overrules the manner of warfare.1 
 
The thunder of artillery on the morning of 22 June 1941 signalled the end of the 
German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. In its place, this unannounced bombardment heralded the 
beginning of a savage war. The war’s criminality was quickly established by both regimes’ 
highest echelons of command. Any international laws governing the standards of warfare 
were wholly neglected by both Germany and the USSR, with atrocities being perpetuated 
under each power’s official orders. Any normative standards that would have otherwise 
influenced the treatment of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war were intentionally 
undermined. Both Hitler, as well as Stalin in response, conceptualised of the conflict as a war 
of extermination, an existential conflict that would bring about the complete destruction of 
either people.2 Atrocity was to become an official operational norm on the frontlines, and this 
atmosphere greatly contributed to what actions were deemed acceptable in the rear-area 
security war. Ideology fuelled excessive violence that, in turn, pushed the conflict to become 
what ideology had promised it would be. 
The aims of the German invasion were inseparable from the Nationalist Socialist 
worldview. The USSR had been long marked as Lebensraum, living space, for German 
colonisation, and this process would be accomplished through the exploitation and 
extermination of the native populace. The extent of these goals was outlined in the official 
Generalplan Ost, which accounted for the deportation and death of between thirty-one and 
forty million civilians in Eastern Europe.3 The primary method to liquidate these civilians was 
the Hunger Plan, under which starvation in order to clear the way for the future German 
pioneers.4 The Hunger Plan was not an arbitrary vestige of ideology but also synchronized 
with Hitler’s and Göring’s beliefs of what would bring victory against the USSR.5 The 
collapse of the home front in 1917 left Hitler with an enduring paranoia of the dangers of a 
poorly fed home population; confiscated food would not only starve the native inhabitants but 
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would also supplement the Reich’s civilian and military rations.6 Germany’s imports of food 
did initially lessen once Operation Barbarossa had begun, after the end of the huge amounts of 
food entering the Reich under the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact trade deals. German 
civilian food rations increased by between twenty and twenty-five percent between 1941-
1943 as a direct result of occupation requisitions.7 The result of this on the ground, however, 
was the starvation of three million Soviet citizens. In the words of one German soldier, the 
requisition groups resembled roving Huns, taking everything from an already impoverished 
populace.8  
 
A deliberate effort was made by the German high command to harmonise Ostheer 
(the German Army operating in the east) conduct with Nazi ideology. The main tactic to 
achieve this goal was the removal of restraints that would have otherwise encouraged mercy. 
Wehrmacht forces were both relieved of judicial obligations, as well as were psychologically 
inured to atrocity. The negation of legal restraints began even before the launching of 
Operation Barbarossa with the “criminal orders”, chief of which was the Commissar Order 
issued on 6 June 1941. These directives called for the immediate execution of political 
figures, partisans and Jews, as well as ordering collective punishments against the local 
populace if suspects were not found for partisan offenses.9 These decrees were subsequently 
adhered to by the vast majority of German commanders on the Eastern Front. Only a 
diminutive number of generals instructed their troops against the execution of commissars and 
civilians, such as Field Marshal Fedor von Bock and Lieutenant-Colonel Henning von 
Tresckow.10 Their comrades-in-arms had almost unconditionally consented to the conflict’s 
radicalisation. In the words of General Erich Hoepener to his troops on 2 May 1941, the 
coming conflict was to be “carried out with unprecedented harshness.”11.  
Complicity in atrocity was simultaneously forced upon Ostheer units, ensuring a 
downward spiral of complicity with Nazi war aims. Merely participating in the war in the 
east, by means of not refusing orders or surrendering to the enemy, personally embroiled 
members of the military in war crimes. To simply ensure that the division was sufficiently fed 
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meant the indirect death of Soviet civilians by starvation.12 At the same time, Jews were used 
as an object of demonstration to psychologically condition onlookers,13 as well as to evoke the 
anti-Semitism of the occupied populations.14 Anti-Semitism was common before the invasion, 
being expressed in pogroms, though the Jews were now used as a model for what conduct 
would be acceptable under the new regime.15 Kate Brown thoughtfully places the reader into 
the position of the civilians that witnessed the start of the Holocaust in their own country: 
It was easy to pick out the Untermensch among the straggling, tattered, and starved 
columns of Jews ... An inhabitant of German-occupied Ukraine could only hope and 
begin to believe that there indeed was something inherently wrong with Jews, 
something that justified the horrifying humiliation and abuse. Hatred of the weak and 
victimized served to protect people from the thought that persecution and death was 
arbitrary and could strike (them) randomly.16  
The outcome of this demonstration was comparable for both the invaders and the occupied 
civilians. Jewish lives were now displayed to be worthless and violence against them would 
go unpunished, if not rewarded.  
 Civilians that collaborated with the invaders were affected by the same murderous 
conditioning as the German forces. Many had initially welcomed the invaders as their 
saviours from Soviet rule. Collaboration was hoped to be the first step to the creation of an 
independent state. Wolodymyr Stachiw, who would later become the Plenipotentiary 
Extraordinary of the short-lived independent Ukraine, wrote directly to Hitler just one day 
after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. Stachiw was writing on behalf of the 
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) when he offered his confidence that Germany 
would defeat the Soviet Union. Calling on Hitler to sanction Ukrainian independence, 
Stachiw beseeched the “champion of the ethnic principle” to “consolidate the new ethnic 
order of Eastern Europe”.17 Germans were similarly received with national flags, flowers, 
bread and salt in the newly-Soviet borderland regions, where armed fifth columnists took the 
invasion as an opportunity to revolt.18 
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Those that volunteered or were drafted into German auxiliary units were tasked with 
the undesirable jobs in the rear-areas. This occurred from the very beginning of the campaign, 
with Lithuanian collaborators being armed and set loose on the population, just three days 
after Operation Barbarossa began.19 Operations such as the guarding of railway lines quickly 
escalated to combating Soviet partisans and punishing villages suspected of supporting the 
Soviets.20 Similarly, wishing to avoid the psychological damage of executing civilians by 
firing squad, this part of the Final Solution was also increasingly tasked to the auxiliary Order 
Police.21 Securing one’s own survival under the new regime may have encouraged placing 
one’s own life before others, but this set a dark precedent for the collaborators. Killing former 
neighbours for the Germans destroyed the boundaries of which actions could be justified to 
preserve your own fate. Survival appears to have been above any deep loyalties to the Nazi 
cause, however. The German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943 alerted the civilian 
population to the possibility of German defeat. Those employed by the German security 
forces deserted in droves, with ten thousand auxiliary policemen leaving German service in 
Ukraine between March and April 1943 alone.22 The various eastern guerrilla forces vied for 
the enlistment of these militia deserters, who offered these forces both the equipment and the 
training that they had received under the Germans.23 The Soviet partisans operating in Belarus 
recruited up to twelve thousand of these deserters in early 1943. The weapons that they 
bolstered the partisan bands with may have been the exact same ones that had killed Soviet 
sympathisers and Jews just a short time earlier.24 
 The importance of civilian collaboration is most important because of the later exodus 
of collaborators into partisan ranks. Just as following Wehrmacht orders often meant 
committing atrocities, collaborating with the occupation often meant killing civilians. Many 
of the those that did so found themselves fighting under the Soviet banner before the end of 
the war. For these civilians, turning on their former commanders offered them a chance of 
atonement; a final chance to avoid suspicion once the USSR overturned the German 
occupation. That these civilian militia would soon fill Soviet ranks has resounding 
implications for the later crimes of the partisans. The simple wish to survive the German 
occupation desensitised many future partisans to the murder of defenceless civilians. In this 
way, German collaboration was the instrument by which the psychology of the Holocaust 
infiltrated partisan ranks. 
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The destruction of judicial restraints was boundless on the Eastern Front, with 
international law being wholly overturned. Both powers upheld that the other was not eligible 
for the protection of Hague or Geneva law, the most recent of which was the 1907 Hague 
Convention and the 1929 Geneva Convention. The 1907 Hague Convention was largely 
declaratory for already-established laws and this was acknowledged during the post-war 
Nuremberg Trials.25 However, the Hague Convention is still worth consulting to assess the 
Eastern Front’s vast distance from international norms. Although there are crossovers, the 
Hague laws have historically limited the means and extent of warfare, with Geneva law 
focusing on humanitarian protections for those affected by conflict, such as civilians and 
prisoners. These conventions prohibit certain weapon types, such as projectiles that release 
fatal or disabling gases, as well as govern the treatment of prisoners of war and the 
requisitioning of material from occupied populations. Germany argued that the USSR was not 
under the protection of the 1929 Geneva laws as the USSR had not ratified the document. 
This argument was invalid, however, as the convention defined the obligations of its 
participants, not of their victims. On the contrary, the USSR had argued that Germany had 
negated any of the USSR’s obligations by violating international law themselves, despite the 
1929 Geneva laws being ratified by Weimar Germany.26 The 1907 Hague Convention had 
been ratified by Tsarist Russia, and the USSR disseminated a protocol on 1 July 1941 for the 
treatment of POWs. These orders matched Hague requirements to a reasonable extent by the 
judgements of the German counterintelligence personnel that had intercepted a copy of it.27 
The stripping of international norms allowed the Wehrmacht to perpetrate the second 
great atrocity of the war, the killing of Soviet prisoners. Those that survived execution at the 
point of capture succumbed to starvation and disease in their millions; these men and women 
were herded into open fields, surrounded by barbed wire and left to die.28 One report by the 
President of the Westphalia Land Labour Office highlighted the situation of the Soviet POWs 
to the Ruhr Coal-Mining Authority on 3 February 1942. Preceded by a request that these 
figures be kept confidential, the Labor Office estimated that fifteen thousand prisoners had 
been dying of typhus every day.29 The mass deaths of Soviet POWs, whether directly or by 
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neglect continued until October 1941. It was at this point that forced labour was eked out of 
the few that still dared surrender to the Germans and survived out-of-hand execution.30 
 The German forces were similarly bound by international law in the occupied rear 
areas, though this too was completely neglected. While Soviet partisans were obligated to act 
in accordance with the 1907 Hague Convention with their tactics against the invaders, it 
seems as though it was domestic, not international law that should have guided their conduct 
against their own people. The partisans were dealing with civilians that they regarded to still 
be Soviet citizens that were awaiting liberation. For the Germans, international law should 
have restricted the material requisitions as well as the services demanded from the occupied 
civilians and POWs, such as in military brothels and labour camps. International law 
mandated that private property beyond “arms, horses, military equipment and military papers” 
were not to be taken from prisoners or civilians.31 Similarly, services were not to be forced 
from of the population except for cases of military necessity.32 The Geneva Convention also 
stipulated that while prisoners could be employed for labour, this must be safe work and must 
not be for the production of war material. In addition, prisoner labour was required to be 
financially compensated for and had to adhere to the work hours of free civilians in that same 
region.33  
These protections were made a mockery of by Germany’s campaign. The German 
labour draft was an integral part of Germany’s occupational strategy in the eastern territories. 
Occupied regions were to be exploited to sustain the Reich, whether by material or by the 
enslavement of able-bodied workers. This draft was both to increase the Reich’s production 
and to deny potential manpower to the Soviets, when able-bodied men could otherwise be 
drafted into the partisans.34 Rumours of the appalling conditions that these workers were 
subjected to quickly reached back to the occupied zones.35 One contemporary complained 
about the state of his Russian workers, explaining that their “miserable” food allowance was 
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leaving them incapable of rudimentary tasks.36 The slave-labour campaign intensified as the 
German army suffered defeats that they would not recover from. By March 1943, following 
the German defeat at Stalingrad, this labour drive was attempting to claim three thousand 
people a day from Reichskommissariat Ukraine.37 At this exact time Fritz Sauckel, the 
Plenipotentiary for Labour Mobilisation, requested that the Führer increase the supply of 
foreign workers. In an unbelievable parody of reality, Sauckel explains “never before have 
foreign workers been so decently treated anywhere in the world as is being done by the 
German population”.38 By the end of the war, children as young as ten were being forcibly 
taken to labour in the Reich. These slaves contributed to the 96% of involuntary labourers, all 
but two-hundred thousand of five million, that were working in Germany in 1944.39   
The Hague Convention effectively ruled that irregular forces, such as partisans, were 
only covered by the protections that it offered to regular soldiers if they conducted themselves 
as regular soldiers. This conduct was defined by the taking of orders from a superior, the 
open carrying of arms, the wearing of identification (an emblem, for example) and the 
partisans’ own observance of international law in their fight with the enemy. If any of these 
stipulations were not held, the irregular fighter was considered to be a war criminal acting 
outside of the authorisation of their state. Execution at the point of capture was considered to 
be a reasonable punishment for war criminals of this category.40 The effect of these laws was 
that partisan war was virtually prohibited, as they denied partisan forces any potential of 
success.41 Despite ratifying (and thereby indicating that they agreed with) the 1907 Hague 
Convention, the USSR upheld that a partisan’s association with regular armed forces should 
provide them with the same legal protections as uniformed soldiers.42 The German occupation 
was not obligated to protect partisans that violated international requirements. However, the 
Hague did outlaw collective violence and the taking of civilian hostages,43 both of which were 
horrendously violated by the occupation forces.  
                                                     
36 Essen, Krupp Works, to Hupe, 14 March 1942, Evidence code D-316, HLS Nuremberg Trials 
Project, Harvard Law School Library, http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/documents/3843-letter-to-dr-
hupe?q=russian+workers#p.1. 
37 Timothy Snyder, “The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943,” Past & Present 179 
(2003), 225. 
38 Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary for Labour Mobilisation, to Hitler, 10 March 1943, Evidence code PS-
407-II, HLS Nuremberg Trials Project, Harvard Law School Library, 
http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/documents/3120-letter-to-hitler-concerning?q=evidence:%22PS-407-
II%22#p.1. 
39 Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, 255. 
40 Oppenheim, International Law, 256, 257. 
41 Heaton, Occupation and Insurgency, 37, 57; Anderson, “Incident at Baranivka,” 594. 
42 Heaton, Occupation and Insurgency, 45.  
43 Anderson, “Incident at Baranivka,” 594. 
26 
German anti-partisan tactics had a long history of harshness and the eastern 
occupations were not spared this doctrine’s extremities. The taking of hostages, execution of 
civilians and razing of property were all cemented in the German counterinsurgency doctrine 
by Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff, in 1870.44 The German army 
suffered from what would become a traumatic insurgency following the decisive defeat of the 
French army at Sedan in 1870.45 Moltke’s doctrine survived to 1945, with the underlying 
theme that rear-area pacification could only be achieved by beating the population into 
submission, rather than by a “hearts and minds” campaign.46 Just as established by Moltke 
over half a century earlier, punishments on the Eastern Front were carried out against civilian 
centres with scant justification. Wehrmacht units performed civilian executions for a number 
of petty offences, such as admitting to being able to read or write, or failing to remove one's 
cap before a German official.47 Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), the Supreme High 
Command of the German Army, ruled that between fifty and one hundred civilians "should be 
executed for every German death."48 These directives were widely followed, with the 
executions of randomly-selected males and the razing of entire villages as common tactics to 
punish the populace.49 In Ukraine alone, two hundred and fifty villages and their inhabitants 
were destroyed under the justification of reprisals.50 Although some commanders recognised 
the short-sightedness of indiscriminate killings, the overarching goal of the occupation was to 
have the populace fear the Germans more than they feared the partisans.51 
Nazi ideology was wedded to the Wehrmacht anti-partisan doctrine, radicalising the 
rear-areas in the same way as the frontlines. The rear-area security war quickly became a 
vehicle for the fulfilment of the Holocaust. Especially in 1941, when the partisan threat was 
nearly non-existent, the Nazi Party’s ideological enemies were the real target of rear-area 
security operations. The definition of “partisan” was used for the justification of the death of 
anyone, with the regime’s ideological enemies, Jews and communists, being targeted for 
immediate execution.52 The perceived connection between Jews and Bolsheviks had long 
been established as a recurrent theme of Nazi ideology. It was during the September 1941 
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Mogilev conference, convened to discuss the Final Solution and anti-partisan warfare, that the 
two topics were joined together with the resounding conclusion that "where there is a Jew, 
there is a partisan”.53 It was not only ideology that drove Wehrmacht atrocity, however. Battle 
frustrations, beginning in the winter of 1941 and escalating with defeats at Stalingrad and 
Kursk, pushed the Wehrmacht to increasingly reckless violence against the civilian 
population.54  
Despite the importance of Nazi ideology in radicalising the conflict, whether or not 
the National Socialist worldview was genuinely accepted by members of the Ostheer is not of 
great consequence to the conclusions of this essay. What is important is the acknowledgement 
that even more restrained Ostheer divisions did partake in the atrocities of the Eastern Front. 
Even units that recognised the necessity of reciprocal engagement with the natives, such as 
the 221st Security Division, still instigated atrocities against the populace. In the 221st’s case, 
despite being so understrength that a general terror campaign was untenable, subordinate 
Battalion 242 still massacred civilians in response to individual frustrations.55 Similarly, even 
units whose supply situation seemed to be relatively stable, such as the notably-restrained 
121st Infantry Division, still played a heavy part in the food requisitions that were 
contributing to the starvation of the natives.56 Actions such as these are critical as they 
represent the fulfilment of Nazi war aims in the east, regardless of a commander’s belief in 
National Socialism and its tenets.  
There are numerous examples of benevolence from the occupation forces, as well as 
true reciprocal good will between the Germans and the occupied.57 However, general 
complicity in Nazi war aims was widespread. Official opposition to the most heinous 
excesses of the war, such as Einsatzgruppe massacres, was rare.58 There are several reasons 
other than ideological conviction for the campaign’s convergence with Nazi war aims, such as 
career benefits, battle frustrations and military necessities, and there is evidence that these 
factors were at times more influential than ideology in the reasons for the troops’ excessive 
violence.59 However, most, if not all of these additional motivations can be understood as 
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having stemmed from Party decisions that would intentionally radicalise their forces.60 As 
such, deliberate high command decisions caused the Wehrmacht operational norms to be 
indistinguishable from Nazi war aims, regardless of if that was the intentions of individual 
soldiers. 
THE SOVIET RESPONSE 
It is important to note that this chapter, the removal of judicial and psychological 
restraints, focuses on the Germans. The radicalisation of warfare was instigated by the 
invaders, having been envisioned and premeditated well before Operation Barbarossa. It must 
be remembered that the Soviet Union was invaded. Although the Stalinist system perpetrated 
horrendous repression against those that fell within its borders, they did not begin the cycle of 
brutality that emerged on the frontlines. However, the Soviet state did consent to the barbarity 
of the war by perpetrating war crimes under official orders. Just as occurred on the German 
side, the judicial and psychological restraints that could have otherwise de-escalated the 
nature of the war were thoroughly undermined. The Soviet state brutalised both their armed 
forces and their civilians, indicating to survivors that any means could be taken in the pursuit 
of victory. The radicalisation of war had a significant effect on the conduct that was to be 
perpetrated in the war’s rear areas. It was here that the lessons of the frontline determined 
both the pitch of violence, as well as the utter mercilessness that was expected from fighters. 
The Hague Convention, as well as the USSR’s own guidelines on the treatment of 
POWs, was commonly breached with extreme violence. Red Army soldiers received mixed 
messages on how they were to treat prisoners, from both the Army’s command structure and 
state propaganda. At times, soldiers interpreted their overarching orders to be the killing of 
any that surrender. Such a view was most prevalent after Stalin’s speech on 6 July 1941, in 
which he called for the “war of extermination” that Hitler had instigated to be met with war in 
kind from the Soviets.61 There are many cases of Red Army personnel expressing that they 
believed their orders were to take no prisoners, in both diaries and under German 
interrogation.62 At worst, German captives were tortured or mutilated, with reports of  the 
removal of eyes and genitals, as well as beheadings and deliberate freezing.63 The terrible 
treatment of Soviet POWs encouraged hideous acts of revenge against German prisoners, 
with state propaganda ensuring that soldiers knew the fates of their captured comrades.64 
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The disregard of judicial restraints allowed for the psychological hardening of 
soldiers to atrocity. The mistreatment of prisoners became something of an ideological 
training exercise, with violence against captives bringing further depravity into the realm of 
possibility. The recollections of one Red Army soldier, Galina Golofeevskaya, exemplify the 
psychological conditioning imposed on both sides. Golofeevskaya explains the effect of her 
reluctant consent to execute a German prisoner: “after that I killed the Germans calmly, I 
thought less about them, and they became only enemies to me.”65 Later, after another similar 
episode, she adds, “a brutalized feeling towards all Germans, especially the ones from 
Stalingrad, arose in me, and there was no inch of regret, I treated them like animals, even 
those we had taken prisoner.”66 These excerpts are from a Soviet interview series, “the 
Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War,” for which Golofeevskaya was asked to recount her role 
in the war, and may be treated with some scepticism as a result. However, the interview at 
least shows that this sort of conduct was believed to have been in line with the state’s policies 
of the time.67 Official orders encouraged the psychological acceptance of war crimes as 
appropriate conduct.  
While the radicalisation of combat normalised increasingly-brutal war crimes, 
prisoners of war were accepted by Red Army soldiers in reasonably large numbers. Both the 
robbing of captives and the execution of prisoners was attempted to be stemmed by the orders 
of conscientious commanders. Such actions had the potential to damage discipline and only 
encouraged ferocity from the invaders who feared being taken alive.68 In one illuminating 
case, one Chief of Political Propaganda attempted to inspire compassion from his corps by 
education. He recommended to one of his counterparts that soldiers be explained “the German 
soldier is a worker and a peasant. He fights not of his own will … once the German soldier 
surrenders, he stops being the enemy.”69 These sentiments were intermittently stressed to the 
troops, with the result that prisoners were taken in far higher numbers than would have 
otherwise been accepted. 
Ironically, while the German prisoners were being offered protections, the Soviet 
state was brutalising its own people in the pursuit of victory. Both soldiers and civilians were 
shown to be completely expendable, even if their sacrifice was for extremely dubious tactical 
benefit. Extreme disciplinary measures were enacted to stem panic and desertion; the so-
called “blocking detachments” were convened to fire on any Soviet soldiers that withdrew 
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without orders to do so.70 In June 1942 blocking detachments were even prohibited from 
firing warning shots before gunning down their comrades.71 Such measures seem to have been 
a necessary evil when generals were sending their Red Army forces in full frontal attacks 
against enemy emplacements. In some of the direst cases, soldiers were reported to have 
linked arms as they ran, simply to help momentum carry their bodies towards the overheating 
machine guns.72 In another tragedy, one thousand mounted soldiers of a Mongolian cavalry 
division charged in open terrain against enemy emplacements. All one thousand were killed 
without causing a single German death.73 The waste of life that such was not limited to 
soldiers, but was also extended to the civilian militia, the People’s Levy (the Russian 
equivalent of the German Volkssturm, the People’s Storm). Often no more than factory 
workers there are cases where mostly unarmed Levy forces were ordered into attack against 
the enemy’s tanks.74 Casualties were enormous in these cases, with the militia simply unable 
to harm their enemies. 
Civilians were similarly brutalised, further affirming that no cruelty would be too 
great in the USSR’s defence. The civilians of Leningrad were exposed to this reality to a 
terrifying extent. Upon taking command of the Leningrad defence, General Zhukov 
threatened soldiers with the execution of their families if they surrendered.75 A soldier could 
not have been blamed for believing Zhukov, with families already being punished with the 
cutting of state support (such as pensions), arrest and deportation if their relatives were 
accused of desertion.76 Stalin affirmed that the enemy’s crimes would be matched only by 
Soviet crimes when he revealed his underlying ideology: “War is merciless, and it will bring 
defeat in the first instance to him who shows weakness and vacillation”.77 This was not a 
hollow statement, having been his reply to the report that Germans were using men, women 
and children as human shields. A civilian’s life became nothing more than a consumable 
object, able to be called upon for any number of perceived boons. This cold logic was again 
displayed in late 1941 when Leningrad apartment-building managers were decimated simply 
to stiffen the city’s resolve.78 Such excessive violence further contributed to the depth of 
brutality that was considered appropriate in the eastern theatre. Whether Stalin’s beliefs of a 
merciless war were necessary and just or not, the Soviet state’s devaluation of life is deeply 
                                                     
70 Beevor, The Second World War, 198. 
71 Bischl, “Presenting Oneself,” 471. 
72 Beevor, The Second World War, 200. 
73 Overy, Russia’s War, 114. 
74 Beevor, The Second World War, 203. 
75 Beevor, The Second World War, 204. 
76 Bischl, “Presenting Oneself,” 472. 
77 Overy, Russia’s War, 90. Beevor, The Second World War, 204, 205. 
78 Overy, Russia’s War, 97, 98. 
31 
significant for the ensuing atmosphere in the rear-areas. The legitimacy of brutality against 
any obstacle to victory, friend or foe, greatly contributed to the extent of violence that was 
considered acceptable in the rear-area security war.  
As has been established so far, judicial and psychological restraints had been 
removed from the conflict. Those that took up arms had been released from any strict 
compliance with international law and norms. War crimes were considered to be acceptable 
conduct, and obscene violence was established as simply one more tool to employ against the 
enemy. At the same time, official orders had nurtured the type of psychology that was 
required to wage a war of this kind. Participation in atrocity had gradually desensitised 
soldiers to the war’s ever-escalating brutality. While the Soviet Union’s role in this is less 
severe, the state still contributed to each of these aspects to a significant extent. 
The rear-area security war would soon be conducted according to the tone of the war 
that had been set on the frontlines. As will be discussed in Chapter III, the civilians that were 
caught between the German security forces and the Soviet partisans were terribly exploited by 
members of both forces. In our effort to explain this phenomenon, it would not be convincing 
if rear-area civilians were expected to have enacted terrible violence against their former 
neighbours simply because the wider war demanded brutality. Similarly, treating one’s 
enemies without mercy would not explain the robbery, rape and murder of otherwise-innocent 
civilians. The missing piece of this explanation is the conceptualisation of civilians living in 
the occupied territories as the enemy. Both National Socialism and Stalinism allowed for the 
view of the occupied civilians as criminal or alien elements. Terrorising, exploiting and 
purging these civilians was able to improve one’s own situation (financially, for example), 
while simultaneously being perceived as helping the war effort. This leads us to Chapter II, to 








CRIMINAL AND ALIEN ELEMENTS: THE UNDERMINING OF MORAL 
RESTRAINT 
 
Both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union ideologues conceptualised civilians under 
the German occupation as inherently culpable and subsequently disposable. This perception 
was another counterweight to moral sensibilities that could otherwise have restrained the 
violence that they were subjected to. At the same time, the idea of a population that innately 
deserved punishment also undermined any question of whether bystanding civilians were 
legitimate targets of war. The guilt that both regimes saw in these civilians was the result of 
foundational tenets of Nazi and Soviet ideology, respectively. The German Wehrmacht and 
the Soviet partisans had this ideology impressed upon them, and members from both forces 
either genuinely believed this ideology, or more likely, took this message as a green light to 
exploit the occupied civilians. The Soviet state condemned its citizens to a criminalised 
destiny, whereby almost every stratum of society was perpetually under suspicion of 
imagined crimes. This criminality was especially extended towards Soviet citizens under 
German occupation, as these peoples’ mere survival under German rule indicated that they 
had not resisted the occupation energetically enough. Similarly, Nazi ideology considered 
eastern peoples to be Untermenschen, subhumans, possessing an intrinsic criminal nature as a 
characteristic of their race. This distrust of the character of eastern peoples was exacerbated 
by racism that had fermented since Germany’s defeat in World War I.  
 The Soviet Union’s suspicion of those living under German rule greatly contributed 
to the lawlessness of the rear areas. The state conceived of civilians as legitimately liable to 
punishment for unproven or future crimes. The quotas of the state security apparatus cared not 
if a crime had reasonable evidence or not, or if punishment was being meted out simply for 
the possibility that a citizen would commit future crimes. The concept of innocent until 
proven guilty did not exist in the USSR, where imagined guilt was proven correct by coerced 
confessions. As Solzhenitsyn explains for a returning Soviet prisoner of war, “As always, the 
interrogation began with the hypothesis that you were obviously guilty.”1 Suspicion was not 
new, but was a perpetual facet of the Soviet system, having become obsessed with enemies, 
both internal and external, since its formation just over two decades earlier.2 One civil war 
Cheka agent explained the security services paradoxical investigative method: “for execution 
we do not need proof, suspicion or interrogation. We find the people necessary and that is 
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all.”3 This strange circular reasoning placed victims in an impossible situation, where their 
execution was justified by their guilt, and their guilt was established not by proof but by the 
authority’s suspicion of them.  
Soviet security mechanisms, refining those of earlier Tsarist rule, were not to punish 
criminal offenders but to repress the population. Early GPU directives explained exile to be 
“not a judicial punishment, but as a measure of social defence”.4 Historian Iain Lauchlan 
thoughtfully notes that the labels that the security services applied to citizens to justify their 
arrest were subjective, such as “Whites, kulaks, bandits, wreckers, hooligans” and 
intellectuals. These categories required no definition and the terms were left to be vague and 
open to interpretation.5 With state suspicion came the infamous practices of public 
denunciations, arrest and torture without warrant, as well as public show trials.6 The 
underlying tenet of these practices was that life was cheap for a Soviet citizen.7 This bleak 
message was blatantly relayed to citizens, with the undisguised nature of state security as an 
element of its terror. Contemporary Gertrude Flor illustrates this aspect of state security when 
she speaks on life in the newly-Soviet Chernivtsi, Ukraine in 1940. Flor describes a widely 
circulated poster that introduced the population to crime and punishment in the USSR. The 
poster depicted a child being rewarded a wristwatch by “Uncle Stalin” for informing on his 
parents, who had complained to one another that there were to again be no eggs for breakfast.8 
Flor, whose own step-father was executed and whose mother was deported, explains that 
“very slowly it became clear to everybody that you couldn’t talk.... You could even think 
against them.” While children were encouraged to denounce their parents, the lives of 
innocents were sacrificed in pursuit of the guilty and both workers and soldiers were 
brutalised by their superiors. In a land of two hundred million, the state’s most abundant 
resource was its most exploited. 
 Rampant suspicion was supplemented by Stalin’s personal distrust of the many ethnic 
minorities within the Soviet Union. The Soviet population was factionalised into categories of 
ethnicity, nationality or place of birth. These categories would be employed to determine 
which populations were to be targeted by the state security apparatus, with ethnicity defining 
one’s perceived potential to commit future crimes against the state. This divisional thought 
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process ran directly contrary to the ideals of an international, homogenous communist front, 
in a dark irony that pervaded the state’s security apparatus. At the same time, the persecution 
of ethnic groups also contradicted one of Stalin’s earlier campaigns, korenizatsiia 
(nativisation), which promoted multinationalism with the creation of sub-territories within the 
USSR from 1923 to the mid-1930s. The central Soviet state encouraged the use of native 
languages and cultural institutions within these republics, to exist alongside the official state 
apparatus.9  
Despite this, the mid-1930s saw ethnicity and place of birth quickly become 
perceived as major indicators for one’s potential to become a traitor in the event of invasion.10 
The myriad suspects to fall under Stalin’s gaze were arrayed in a great host from the Western 
Ukrainian borderlands to the Far Eastern reaches: “Ukrainians, Poles, Latvians, Germans, 
Estonians, Finns, Bulgarians, Romanians and Greeks”, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, “Turks, 
Kurds and Iranians … Chinese and Koreans”, in a regretfully inexhaustive list, were 
suspected of an innate desire to collude with the regime’s enemies.11 These people had either 
immigrated to the Soviet Union and were feared to be riddled with saboteurs, or were internal 
nationalities with past conflicts against the Soviet state in recent memory.12 These suspicions 
were not arbitrary and millions were targeted for deportation, imprisonment and execution as 
a result, with the number of victims reaching a height in the wake of the German advance in 
1941. Stalin's security machinations deported 3,266,340 people to the Soviet interior between 
1941 and 1948, with two thirds of these three million being targeted for their ethnic categories 
alone.13 These victims would find themselves in the wastelands of the interior, with food, 
clothing and shelter barely able to sustain life. Ten percent of the deportees died during their 
terms, with the highest national death rates reaching twenty-five percent.14 To this, 
Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin’s foreign minister, would attest that even Stalin’s prewar Great 
Terror was chiefly to target these future collaborators, with their bloodlines determining their 
destiny to betray their country.15 Ethnic cleansing, underpinned by rampant suspicion was 
deeply entrenched in Stalin’s approach to crime and punishment.16 
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 The lack of restraint that the partisans enjoyed in their dealings with the occupied 
civilian population was a direct result of the USSR’s crime and punishment system. Both the 
moral and judicial restraints that could have otherwise curbed partisan excesses were 
undermined by the state’s firmly-established security methods. Civilians in the rear areas 
were perceived as infested with criminality and the persecution of these criminal elements 
was considered to be within the partisan’s role. A key component of the occupied civilian’s 
criminality was Stavka’s disavowment of passive resistance as a legitimate civilian strategy. 
The survival of those living under German occupation indicated to the Soviet command that 
they were either guilty of some form of collusion with the enemy, or were not loyal enough 
Soviets to sufficiently resist the invaders. In this perversion of logic, slave labourers, such as 
ghettoised Jews, were involuntarily but directly contributing to the German war effort and 
deserved no rescue as a result.17 The state’s legitimation of punishing citizens without 
evidence for imagined or potential, future crimes provided the partisans with an 
unquestionable, undebatable jurisdiction to continue NKVD-style policing in the rear-areas.  
 
Partisans were able to enter villages and, as one partisan veteran, Philip Helbling, 
recalled, simply kill the civilians that were “no good.” Helbing provides one example for this, 
in which his orders were relayed to him by the member of his unit that he suspected to be its 
imbedded political commissar, with Helbling explaining that “my mission was to kill the 
collaborators”. Helbling recalls that no evidence was provided to him to justify the execution 
of the civilians, even in spite of his friendship with the one giving the order.18 Another 
partisan veteran, Nikolai Obryn’ba fighting in the Belarus region of Polotsk, describes his role 
as almost identical to Helbling’s. One instance began with Obryn’ba’s group encircling a 
village and taking the residents hostage. At this point, Obryn’ba’s partisan commander called 
for an investigation into the hostages’ guilt with no more direction than the curt order to “sort 
them out”. Despite having no prior knowledge of any of the villagers’ guilt, Obryn’ba 
executed two civilians, one of which had worked as a land surveyor for the German 
administration. The most significant aspect of this instance is not the act itself, but the 
executor’s own conception of his investigation. He explains, “Logic was my only weapon in 
the prosecution. I had neither witnesses nor time - logic alone had to prove a man’s guilt or 
innocence’. Just as the civil war Chekists of earlier decades, Obryn’ba concludes that “My 
conscience was clear.”19 
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This methodology was a direct continuation of Soviet policing, extended to the 
German-occupied territories. If they were so inclined, partisans were able to brutalise the 
population without concern that their victims may be deemed to be innocent or that their 
excesses would be punishable by their superiors. The ability to justify the execution of 
anybody, without evidence, investigation or orders, provided the partisans with limitless 
potential to exploit the civilian population. Victims of robbery and rape could simply be killed 
with the unquestionable justification that they were collaborators. As no evidence was 
required prior to execution, no evidence could be provided to the executor’s superiors. One 
last conclusion is clear from these cases, that at least a portion of the partisans had 
internalised the state’s conception of crime and punishment. No investigation was required, 
no questions were asked, and execution was the only punishment. 
 
 The German security forces similarly criminalised the occupied civilian populations 
through a convergence of ideology and historical experience. The eastern populations were 
believed to have an innate criminality, an untrustworthiness and a maliciousness that resulted 
from their race or their assumed political orientation. Many military units were under the 
leadership of generals and field-marshals that despised the eastern peoples. This hatred had 
become institutionalised from these commander’s World War I experiences: Slavs were 
condemned for the brutality of the Russian invasion of eastern Germany in 1914; the 
Bolsheviks were perceived as having spread their ideology like a disease to the German 
people; and Jews were thought to be intrinsically tied to the “stab in the back” that contributed 
to German surrender in 1918.20 The German military’s traditional anti-communism and anti-
Semitism, as well as the understanding that Slavs must be treated without mercy, was 
accentuated by the Polish campaign and years of ideological indoctrination.21 Some Slavic 
peoples were afforded a degree of favour under the occupation, such as Ukrainians, who were 
thought to be descended from the Germanic Ostrogoths.22 However, the vast majority of those 
under the population, Slavs, Jews and communists, were thought to be innately and 
unconditionally guilty. The Mogilev conference of September 1941, introduced in Chapter I, 
was one of the chief influences on the definition of a partisan widening to include anyone that 
the occupation forces desired.23 The wide autonomy than individual commanders had in the 
pacification of their territories, to be discussed in Chapter III, meant that the personalities of 
these commanders had more of an impact on their operations than otherwise would have been 
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possible. As such, the military’s institutionalised enmities seamlessly melded with Nazi 
ideology and a conception of the civilian population as legitimate war targets, infested with 
their historic and genetic culpability.  
Moral restraint was not only undermined by ideology but was heavily supplemented 
by alcohol abuse. Despite severe malnutrition reported in many of the partisan units, alcohol 
was sought out to bewildering extents. By the advanced stages of the war, Soviet airdrops 
provided munitions, medical supplies, weaponry, retrieved the wounded and inserted political 
commissars but rarely provided food to the partisan units.24 Food was short supply across the 
front, with partisan units seeming to take lesser priority than the already underfed Red Army. 
One veteran that served with both the partisans and the Red Army on the Stalingrad front 
recalls his Army unit’s search for anything that they could eat, including stray cats in the 
ruins.25 With the regular armed forces suffering from such supply issues, partisans were left to 
a similar fate, having to become entirely self-sufficient for their food consumption. Despite 
this, alcohol was consumed to excess before, during and after operations. Another partisan 
veteran, Joshua Fishmann, recalls that despite a meagre diet of only bread and potatoes, with 
poor-enough conditions that the unit experienced an outbreak of typhus, alcohol was still 
commonly consumed. In one incident that stood out to Fishmann, excess casualties were 
taken when many members of his unit were drunk as they attempted to defend against a night 
attack.26 One partisan veteran, Elia Miranski, passed down his personal history to his 
daughter, who recalled that moonshine was brewed in the forests by Miranski’s group, 
operating outside of Valozhyn, Belarus. Miranski’s daughter explained that alcohol was used 
to calm the group’s shattered nerves before military actions.27  
In such dire circumstances as the partisans found themselves within, the procurement 
of alcohol had become a central part of their unit’s raison d'être. Some villages were 
effectively forced to buy their protection from the partisans with liquor, with one commander 
claiming to have “several hundred examples of partisans beating, hanging or shooting 
peasants for only a half a litre of alcohol.”28 With alcohol’s significance, intoxication must be 
understood as one of the influences on the lack of restraint in the rear-areas. While it is clear 
that drunkenness alone does not account for the rampant robbery, rape and murder of fellow 
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citizens, alcohol undoubtedly played a part in the undermining of moral and ethical 
inhibitions in the rear-areas. 
Occupation forces similarly abused drugs and alcohol to facilitate compliance with 
their brutal orders. The “stimulant decree” of 17 April 1940 officially introduced Pervitin, a 
pill form of methamphetamine developed by the Berlin Temmler pharmaceutical company, 
into the medical supplies of the Wehrmacht and the SS. Pervitin had been used widely by the 
Wehrmacht during the invasion of Poland and France with the effects of eliminating fatigue 
and inhibitions while increasing confidence and aggression.29 While Pervitin alone is not 
significant for its effect on moral restraint, it has significant implications for how accepted 
substance use was. Pervitin was an integral part of a culture of substance reliance with which 
to plug the gaps of human endurance. The frontlines demanded unceasing energy and 
vigilance from the Wehrmacht, and Pervitin’s popularity shows the acceptance of external 
substances to meet this demand. 
Just as the frontlines demanded physical endurance from the Wehrmacht, the 
Holocaust was demanding psychological endurance in the rear areas. The Germans were 
aware of the psychological damage that executing civilians would have on their forces, even 
despite the propaganda campaign against Jews and Untermenschen.30 On 11 July 1941 an 
order to kill all male Jews between 17 and 45 that were found looting in Bialystok, Poland, 
was accompanied with an order to ensure that the "spiritual care" of the executioners be 
maintained with evening social events, recreation and constant reinforcement about the 
"political necessity" of the killings.31 While gradual complicity had been fostering a 
desensitisation to executions, this was not enough. One member of the Order Police recalls 
the integral part that alcohol played in the “spiritual care” of his unit: “Most of the other 
comrades drank so much solely because of the many shootings of Jews, for such a life was 
intolerable sober.”32 
Alcohol was to become the final influence on the removal of moral restraints. The 
terrorising of defenceless civilians, even those defined as ideological enemies, still required 
this element to reach the extent that it did on the Eastern Front. The events of 17 August 1942 
exemplify the horrendous role of alcohol in the eastern rear-areas, at Łomazy, a Polish village 
within the Generalgouvernement, roughly fifty kilometres from the modern-day Belarusian 
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border. The execution of the Jewish population of Łomazy, some 1,700 civilians, was carried 
out by the Order Police and Slavic Hiwis (abbreviated from Hilfswillige, the optimistically-
termed “willing helpers”). The executioners at Łomazy became increasingly drunk throughout 
the killings, steadying themselves in the knee-high pool of blood and groundwater that had 
formed in the killing-site’s mass grave. Several of the perpetrators still had a bottle of vodka 
in hand as they fired wildly into the mass of victims, many of which were left to suffocate or 
drown after being hit with nonfatal shots.33 While a full exploration of alcohol’s role in the 
east has yet to be attempted, its use in the psychological facilitation of mass killings is clear. 
Drug use helped allow the occupational forces to carry out horrendous acts against the civilian 
population. Methamphetamine helped normalise substance dependence in the Wehrmacht, 
acting as a precursor to the widespread consumption of alcohol that was used so deliberately 
to undermine moral restraint. Alcohol can be clearly seen as another factor that destroyed 
personal, moral sensibilities, harmonising with the host of other influences in the creation of 
lawlessness. 
The undermining of morality is deeply significant to explain the double-victimisation 
of the occupied civilians. As we have seen, the depravity of the frontlines fostered a war that 
within which any violence, however obscene, was able to be enacted against the enemy. This 
possibility was imposed on top of the National Socialist worldview, which saw criminality as 
an intrinsic facet of the Eastern European Untermenschen. Similarly, Soviet law and order, 
particularly under Stalin, saw the population of the borderlands as divisive fifth columnists. 
Both regimes’ governments encouraged the punishment of these civilians without mercy, and 
most importantly, without evidence of their crimes. Any scruples of morality that remained 
against these enemies was undermined by the prevalence of alcohol in both forces, with 
violence committed under its effects escalating the perpetrators’ complicity with atrocity.   
The criminality of the occupied civilians seems to have been a profoundly significant 
element to their exploitation. From this, terrorising the civilian population was able to be 
conducted either under the guise of a legitimate act of war, or on the contrary, this could have 
been actually believed to have been a legitimate act of war. Under such a mindset, the civilian 
that had just been robbed of their winter food stocks could be conceived of as a saboteur or a 
kulak (a wealthy land-owning peasant), hoarding supplies to the detriment of the war effort. 
Worse still, what rights did a civilian marked as an agent of the enemy have to their home or 
their life? Even sexual violence may have been understood in this way as some perverted 
form of extractive revenge against a subversive enemy. 
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III 
AUTONOMY, CHOICE AND DISCIPLINE 
 
Despite the rigid nature of Nazi and the Soviet ideology, both security divisions and 
partisan commanders enjoyed enough autonomy to restrain their methods if they wished to do 
so. Institutional rivalries, competing jurisdictions and bureaucratic mismanagement provided 
each force with a host of conflicting orders. Any one of these orders could be invoked to 
justify a great spectrum of conduct in the rear areas. Commanders could employ a hearts and 
minds campaign, limiting requisitions and otherwise-indiscriminate reprisals; or 
requisitioning could ensure the populace starved and reprisals could destroy entire population 
centres. The legal freedom provided to both forces allowed them to commit excessive 
offences against the occupied civilians without penalty, though punishments were similarly 
light if commanders shirked direct orders to brutalise the populace. The result was that the 
exploitation of the occupied civilians was both by design and consented to by the 
commanders on the ground; the preconditions that encouraged and allowed individual 
offences against civilians had been set, and many commanders took the opportunity to exploit 
the populace over the range of options available to them. 
Institutional anarchy provided rear-area German commanders with a vast set of 
conflicting orders. Much of the operational management of the partisan war fell to institutions 
below Hitler, with the dictator separating himself from the day-to-day administration of the 
Reich. The establishments that took on Hitler’s discarded portfolios, such as the Wehrmacht, 
the SS and the Foreign Ministry, fought between themselves with competing claims to 
counterinsurgency policy.1 Hitler’s administrative aloofness effectively provided his 
subordinates with only the long-term, ideology-laden goals of the occupation. This long-term 
vision, without specific instructions for its achievement, is illustrated in one particular 
meeting between Hans Lammers (Chief of the Reich Chancellery), Alfred Rosenberg (Leader 
of the Foreign Policy Office and leading ideologue) and Hitler. Lammers documents the 
minutes of the interaction, within which Reichskommissariat Ukraine's future was being 
considered. The outcome was that it would likely remain a Reich colony for at least twenty-
five years, but the operational requirements for this are not mentioned in the document.2 In 
much the same way, Norway was to become part of the Greater German Reich “in a hundred 
or so years”.3 These were not a lone incidents, with Lammers or Martin Bormann (most 
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importantly Secretary to the Führer) increasingly left to pass Hitler's rare, vague and abstract 
commandments down to his subordinates.4 Despite his reclusiveness, Hitler vehemently 
attested that only his campaign decisions were correct, and dissenting commanders were 
ostracised, redeployed and replaced.5 By December 1941, Hitler had placed himself as 
Commander-in-Chief of the army. Richard Evans explains the supreme position that Hitler 
was in as “complete dominance over the top army commanders.”6 The dictator went on to do 
little more than obtusely order against retreat of any kind, insisting that an indomitable will 
would achieve the Final Victory.7 The little central direction that Hitler gave to the various 
hydra heads snapping at one another were lofty, out-of-touch ideological commandments. The 
result of a dictator-less dictatorship, where power was determined not by rank but by personal 
ties with the reclusive leader (reclusive from both physical contact as well as from the 
realities of the war), was endemic administrative breakdown.8 The struggle for power between 
institutions whose status had been raised by Hitler's whims reached disastrous heights of 
eventually-unrepairable inefficiency.9  
The conduct by which overarching orders were achieved was largely in the hands of 
commanders on the ground. Although commanders received general orders, the way in which 
their objectives were achieved could be significantly influenced by their own wishes. Just as 
Hitler only provided vague ideological orders, the Wehrmacht was also operated by the 
principle of mission command, or Auftragstaktik. In this, commanders received orders to 
achieve a general objective. Commanders on the ground were expected to interpret the 
situation in the field and to pursue their directives in the way they thought most fitting.10 At 
the same time, the key to navigating military red tape was by interpreting one’s actions as 
achieving Hitler’s vague ideological aims. Any action justified as vaguely to the benefit of the 
Führer was almost assured to be sanctioned.11 As Ian Kershaw explains his concept of 
“working towards the Führer”, the interpretive power available to the mechanisms of the 
Third Reich was centred on the distant figure of the leader. Simply "Invoking the Führer’s 
name”, he contends, “was the pathway to success and advancement."12 Kershaw dubs Hitler 
as the great "enabler" of the Third Reich: a pervasive guarantee of an action's retroactive 
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sanction.13 Compounding the effect of bureaucratic infighting and conflicting orders, German 
commanders were able to creatively suggest, rebuke and sanction orders at will. 
Although the focus of this essay is to explain the crimes of individuals, the concept of 
Auftragstaktik, as well as the retroactive justification of actions as beneficial to the Reich, is 
still significant as a potential counterbalance to lawlessness. That a commander could be 
tasked to pacify a region and could personally decide on a harsh or tempered occupation gives 
insight to the ability of commanders to somewhat redress the norms that were acceptable in 
their domains. While a benign occupation was utterly incompatible with the ideological war 
aims of the Nazi state, there were opportunities for the occupation to temper itself if desired. 
The needs of the Reich, paired with the other preconditions to brutality that have been 
explored thus far, virtually ensured the occupation’s harshness. However, there is a vast gulf 
between implementing a doomed hearts-and-minds campaign and the creation of the 
occupation region as a Todeszone, a dead-zone devoid of civilian life. 
The success of conscientious commanders to limit their troops’ offences was largely 
unsuccessful. Despite unparalleled control over some areas of discipline, excessive offences 
against the civilian population were largely outside of their authority. This is another 
important element of the autonomy of the German occupation, as just as there were 
mechanisms to allow for less brutal treatment of the population, there were no levers to avoid 
the opposite. As Omer Bartov correctly notes, “It was difficult to punish the men for acts that 
merely emulated similar and far more destructive official actions.”14 Wehrmacht officials 
effectively had disciplinary jurisdiction over only some offences as a result of the troops’ 
legal freedom under the criminal orders. The disciplinary control that commanders held was 
primarily to maintain combat discipline and morale. Punishment was severe for actions such 
as blunt insubordination and self-inflicted wounds, with roughly twenty thousand soldiers 
executed by the end of the war.15 These punishments were new to the modern German state, 
with disciplinary executions far exceeding World War I levels.16 Soldiers were commonly 
executed out-of-hand for crimes of cowardice but could only be pleaded with, often 
unsuccessfully, to desist from massacring defenceless victims.17 Obscene offences against 
civilians were forced to be begrudgingly accepted by German officers as a steam-valve 
solution to the threat of morale and combat discipline dropping with the radicalised war 
conditions. However, given that uncontrolled executions themselves were feared to be 
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damaging to morale and discipline, these steam-valve killings were effectively the lesser of 
two evils for a commander attempting to alleviate the ever-present risk of desertion. 
It would have been imprudent for commanders to proactively punish their soldiers 
further, already being faced with manpower shortages with the then-unprecedented 1941 
losses. German security forces had never been adequately reinforced to control the vast rear-
areas. These numbers only diminished as the war continued, being replaced with increasingly-
inferior reserves.18  
Even when OKH decided that a more measured treatment of the population was 
necessary in late 1941, the criminal orders were still largely upheld by the majority of the 
army’s regiment commanders.19 Ideology, personality and the military’s influence in the 
Reich  played a part, with many commanders sharing the ideological resolve that the Nazi 
heads demanded against the state’s mortal enemies, Jews, Bolsheviks and Slavs.20 In all, the 
disciplinary measures of the Third Reich still facilitated an unrestricted approach to the 
civilian population. The difficulty of commanders to punish their troops’ excessive violence, 
paired with their frequent unwillingness to do so, undermined the effect that military 
discipline could have to restrain offenses against the civilian population. 
The vast majority of Soviet partisans were similarly governed by an anarchic struggle 
between the NKVD, Red Army and Party officials until the Central Staff was formed on 30 
May 1942. Bureaucratic tension between these three groups caused partisan lives to be 
exchanged, seized and sacrificed in political power games. Mismanagement, whether 
accidental or intended to spite another agency, was endemic, with conflicting spheres of 
authority leaving partisans without coherent orders.21 Conflicting jurisdictions were a daily 
chaos, that was only partially alleviated once the partisans were under the task of the Central 
Staff. Kenneth Slepyan highlights the bureaucratic anarchy facing a partisan commander of 
the Vitebsk Oblast (translated as “province”), who could at once receive orders and have to 
simultaneously report to “representatives of the Kalinin Front, the Belorussian Staff, the 
Vitebsk Obkom, and the Central Staff itself, not to mention the operational groups of the 
Third and Fourth Shock Armies”.22 Even if it was possible to concurrently satisfy each of 
these factions, the Central Staff were constantly under threat from partisans becoming 
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partizanshchina, described by the regime as showing “disobedience, lack of political 
consciousness, possessing unorthodox or even hostile ideology, and pursuing the interests of 
one’s self or one’s group over those of the state.”23 Despite the variety of partisan groups, 
whether they resemble civilian self-defence groups or specially-inserted guerrilla forces, all 
levels of the partisan movement displayed traits befitting the partizanshchina label at times.24 
There were measures to minimize the chance of conflicting orders, and subsequently avoid 
allowing partisans to choose their desired course of action, such as having to seek approval 
before addressing a partisan band. These requests wasted crucial time, however, and counter-
measures were introduced to allow the circumvention of these permission requests.25 Such red 
tape greatly hampered military efficiency, however, with this multi-layered system having 
become a complicated, confusing apparatus. Rival institutions gave life-or-death orders to the 
partisans from within this bureaucratic web, with the Central Staff (and at times, even Stalin) 
as the arbitrator of their disputes.  
 
The realities of war similarly hampered coherent central strategy behind the 
frontlines. A moving front, as well as the fragility and spontaneity of partisan operations, 
undoubtedly heightened the already-complicated command structure. Neither armies nor 
partisan bands remained in permanent locations, creating a fluid succession of changing 
battlefield commanders to liaison between. In addition, it was not uncommon for partisan 
bands to be wholly annihilated, drafted into the regular armed forces or Soviet labour 
battalions. At the same time, new partisan bands could be formed in their absence, or 
previously-unknown partisans could be discovered behind enemy lines.26  
Full control over the partisans was to be inevitably difficult as a result, but this was not the 
only operational issue frustrating an efficient chain of command. Even radio communication 
with all of the known detachments, then numbering 1,079, was only established in December 
1943. This vital element to coordinated rear-area harassment was only completed eight 
months after the German defeat at Stalingrad, in what is now widely considered to be the loss 
from which the German army was unable to recover from. Prior to that, the Central Staff 
estimated that it only had radio lines to between ten and fifteen percent of the then-far-less-
numerous partisan bands in mid-1942.27 Orders could only be delivered by courier to units 
without radio equipment. This undertaking was near-useless, however, with orders taking 
forty to fifty days to reach their target and with mortality rates of just over seventy percent 
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from one particular station in the Orel Oblast.28 A partisan band’s spontaneous nature was 
only encouraged by the lack of orders reaching them. By the time that full communications 
had been established, the flawed command mechanism was reaching units that had already 
spent the first chapter of the war being devoted to simply staying alive. 
 
Many partisans exploited the complicated hierarchy above them to the advantage of 
their primary goal: survival. Partisans seem likely to have issued themselves falsified orders 
in a number of cases, playing conflicting departments off against one another. These forgeries 
allowed them to act as they wished and were often employed to counteract undesirable orders 
that they had already received.29 One such example concerns the 2nd Voroshilov Partisan 
Brigade, consisting of 590 members operating out of the Briansk Oblast, Russia. This 
particularly-large unit had been ordered to undertake a dangerous raid deep into occupied 
Ukraine in February 1943. The heads of this brigade countered this order with directives that 
had them, in their words, marching “from one place to the other”. An addition order, later 
reckoned by the Central Staff to be a forgery, was created under the falsified authority of 
Marshall (Chief of Staff) Vasil’evskii, directing the Voroshilov band to remain in the relative 
safety of the Briansk forest. These fake orders were adhered to until June 1943, when the 
brigade was destroyed by a German attack.30 The Voroshilov group’s poor luck does not 
detract from its ability to selectively evade their real orders for four months. The complexities 
of the partisans’ command structure, as well as the Central Staff’s tentative communications 
with them, allowed for the institutional inefficiency that could be exploited by fighters on the 
ground. That forged orders could go unexamined highlights both the inefficiency of the 
command system to recognise errors, as well as the atmosphere of the apparatus where 
contradictory orders cancelling one another out were not investigated with any haste. 
 
Even partisan bands that simply followed genuine orders could choose the nature of 
their conduct to a reasonable degree. The official partisan doctrine changed several times 
during the conflict, providing partisans with official justification for both harsh and moderate 
treatment of the civilian population. Early Stavka policies were considerably destructive to 
civilians, calling on partisans to conduct a scorched-earth campaign against civil buildings. 
This tactic was announced by Stalin’s Order No. 428 on 17 November 1941 that required the 
destruction of all settlements located between forty and sixty kilometres from the frontlines as 
well as all road-side settlements between twenty and thirty kilometres from all roads. One 
hundred thousand Molotov cocktails were distributed for this purpose, and 398 settlements 
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had been destroyed in the following two weeks alone.31 As will be discussed further in 
Chapter III, even partisan commanders that pushed the boundaries of these orders and 
destroyed more than was necessary were not punished.32 The civilians that were left homeless 
were at great risk of perishing with winter looming. One can only imagine the horror of 
surviving the frontline moving through your village, only to have it razed to the ground by the 
few people that might otherwise protect it. 
 
By 1942, new orders directed partisans to enter friendly relations with the population 
in the interest of fermenting a state-wide uprising. The scorched-earth destruction of civilian 
property, however, still fell under the category of necessary military objectives and was still 
possible as a result.33 Contradictory orders, bespeaking a confused state policy, continued 
throughout the war. Soviet partisans were able to call on any one of the conflicting orders to 
justify their actions to the political commissars that were assigned to them as the war 
progressed. By the end of the war, the term “partisan” could denote several types of insurgent. 
The types of fighters could starkly differ from one another, ranging from those who 
welcomed families and the defenceless, to those that mercilessly provoked German reprisals 
against innocent villagers.34 The leader of partisan forces in wartime Belarus, Panteleimon 
Ponomarenko, discouraged hostile actions against the peasantry, advocating for the 
acceptance of volunteers rather than conscription, as well as positive relations with the 
locals.35 Ponomarenko called a “dysfunctional” relationship with the peasantry “the most 
serious crime of all”.36 This official attitude starkly contrasts with commonly-held attitudes on 
the ground, however. One partisan veteran interviewed after the war confirms that reports of 
the partisans provoking German reprisals against the populace are essentially accurate. 
Ponomarenko’s directives are wholly contradicted, with the veteran explaining, “If a village 
had to be burned down for this purpose [to encourage the support of the surviving populace], 
there was no mercy.”37 Whether following imaginary, ideological or official orders, partisans 
were able to decide the nature of their conduct to a great extent. This lack of control was only 
a continuation of the preconditions to individual crimes. 
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Individualistic crimes could be disguised as contributions to the war effort but even 
undeniably criminal acts were seldom punished. The major cause of this was the culture of 
freedom that had developed within the partisan bands. One of the appeals of partisan 
enlistment was living outside of the regime’s gaze and beyond the state apparatus of control. 
Partisans were mythologised as free, nomadic fighters akin to the peasant and Cossack rebels 
of earlier centuries.38 In line with this, a significant portion of the partisan bands were fighters 
who viewed enlistment as a chance for “reckless adventure”,39 in the words of one partisan 
commander operating in occupied Ukraine, A. Fyodorov. Fyodorov goes on to recall these 
fighters to be “the fellows who thirsted for ‘autonomy.’” The freedom that partisan life 
offered these members would have undoubtedly been welcomed after life under Soviet or 
German rule. The state’s laws were supplanted with what Joseph Elman, a Jewish partisan 
veteran, refers to as the “rule of the jungle”.40 Not only was this freedom characterised by an 
absence of military organisation but also by open banditry. True to the definition of 
partizanschina, the partisan’s freedom was closely tied with hostility to authority and 
individualistic crime. Although this was a more dangerous period, it was also more lucrative 
for opportunistic fighters. As a result, commanders were often challenged or ignored as they 
attempted to curtail their fighters’ actions. Partisans nearly mutinied against their commander 
in one instance, when their consumption of jam was to be rationed.41 Even if a partisan 
commander held the view that the civilian population should be protected, such as by 
restraining the requisitioning of their goods, they may have been unable to express this for 
fear of retribution. The frustrated partisan bands were sometimes uncontrollable by their 
commanders, who feared assassination if they reprimanded their “drunken, marauding 
fighters”.42  
The lack of punishment for violence against the occupied civilians only exacerbated 
the likelihood of their exploitation. Offences perpetrated against even the most obviously-
innocent civilians were seldom or insufficiently punished. This was largely a result of each of 
the other preconditions discussed thus far. Civilians could be treated without any mercy for 
what were only imagined crimes. Civilians were terrorised simply because it was possible to 
do so, and any offences against them could be justified by the excuse that they were 
subversive elements. At the same time, both the German counterinsurgency forces and the 
Soviet partisans enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy. The ability for a commander to 
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dictate the nature of their force’s conduct represents a potential, but rarely employed, 
counterweight to the many influences encouraging brutality. That many commanders did not 
protect the civilian population highlights the extent to which they were either unwilling or 




































The deep mire of preconditions established so far were seized by the German security 
divisions and the Soviet partisans. Crimes were committed against the occupied populace 
outside of operational orders, for personal gain and to the detriment of their state’s military 
cause. The civilians caught between each force suffered looting, robbery, murder and rape 
from both forces on a daily basis. This is not to say that all occupation forces and all partisan 
members acted in this same way, and the motivations for these offences are varied, though the 
overwhelming picture that forms from this is that the civilians were trapped within a war that 
had the ability to reach out and touch them personally. Mattia Tualdo of the European Council 
on Foreign Relations for the Middle East and North Africa, was recently interviewed on 
living under a dictatorship, or in the power vacuum that follows them. Although Tualdo was 
discussing Libyans under Gaddafi, his thoughtful comment holds true for those in the 
occupied Soviet Union during World War II: “It’s a hard choice between dictatorship and 
anarchy, your life is in danger anyway. It’s just that instead of one oppressor, you have 
many.”1 Especially for those living in the newly-Soviet borderlands, having survived the 
deportations and executions of the USSR’s takeover, civilians found themselves as objects of 
exploitation for both the Germans and the partisans.  
 
Looting occurred to a great extent from the early stages of the Second World War, but 
it was radicalised with the removal of any restraints in the east. It was not abandoned cars 
being looted by soldiers in the east, however, but food and homes. The Hunger Plan, in the 
larger context of Generalplan Ost, called for the merciless requisitioning of all food available 
to the invaders. The millions that had their last cow or last bushel of grain taken at gunpoint 
died as an intentional result of that exterminationist policy. It would have been certain death 
for the invaders to have been caught without sufficient shelter as temperatures dropped. 
Whole villages were forcibly evacuated by the occupiers to meet this need, and the fates of 
the fleeing civilians cannot have been unknown to the soldiers who took up residence in their 
abandoned properties. Although looting was inextricably tied to the murderous policies of the 
Nazi state, one can imagine the dire circumstances that some soldiers found themselves within 
in the east. With the front turning against them to an ever-escalating degree and with miles of 
inhospitable land between them and their bombed, blockaded homes, taking opportunities to 
salvage one’s assets does not seem beyond the common course that wars take. However, the 
                                                     
1 “Is Partition Libya’s Future?” Late Night Live (Sydney: ABC, April 19, 2017). 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/latenightlive/is-partition-libyas-future/8453830. 
50 
extent and intent of the looting in the rear areas does aid in forming an understanding of the 
horrors of the German occupation. 
 
The occupation forces were able to employ any one of their comprehensive guiding 
orders to kill anyone they desired. Innocents could be chosen for out-of-hand execution for 
crimes of partisan affiliation, racial inferiority and suspected communist sympathies. By the 
end of the war, reprisals had caused a significant amount of the 3.1 million civilians killed and 
the twenty-eight thousand villages and hamlets destroyed. Murder was intrinsically linked to 
the other crimes of the occupation, robbery and sexual violence. The occupation forces were 
placed in a position where questions were rarely asked if the murdered “partisan” had been 
killed to silence any reports of rape, or owned wealthy property that was to be used by the 
police or local Volksdeutsche (locals considered to be German enough to move into positions 
of influence in the occupied regions). Personal gain was not the only impetus for German 
reprisals, as highlighted in the work of historians such as Ben Shepherd who identifies the 
influences of German military tradition and culture, careerism, a harsh interpretation of 
military necessity and battle frustrations.2 Of these, careerism stands out as a particularly 
significant element as it involves personal gain for a civilian’s brutalisation. Including 
massacred civilians in the numbers of killed enemy partisans gave security commanders 
direct, personal career benefits. The benefit of such actions is outside of the realm of military 
aims simply as the German tactic of brutalising the population into submission did not work. 
The brutalisation of the civilian population in 1941 was unnecessary, as much of the populace 
would have been otherwise receptive to German rule and did not support the miniscule 
partisan movement.3 Both the survivors of reprisals and those fleeing the slave labour 
campaign had little choice but to join the partisans, which was, of course, exploited by the 
partisans themselves. It is possible that security commanders did not realise that their brutal 
submission tactics were ultimately helping the partisan movement, especially as only a 
diminutive number of German commanders openly warned about an imprudently harsh 
occupation. However, it is reasonable to assume, as horrific as it is, that some security 
commanders pursued the career opportunities that killing civilians gave them, regardless of if 
this achieved any real tactical advantages, or directly despite it not doing so. 
 
Despite its utter contradiction of Nazi war aims and gender ideology, sexual violence 
was a pervasive phenomena on the Eastern Front. The only requirement in the majority of 
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cases was not the victim’s ethnicity, bloodline or culture, but their sex.4 Even Nazism’s 
mortal enemy, Jews, were not spared from this aspect of the occupation. Perverse “beauty 
shows” were held more than once, where both the winners and losers were executed together.5 
Sexual violence greatly melds together with robbery and murder, but theft in these cases is not 
material, but bodily, and the crime is in isolation of the murder that often occurred just 
afterwards. With a famished native population and the appeasement of the invaders’ absolute 
authority as one of the few ways to preserve one's life, the Germans held total dominion over 
their captive’s bodies.  
 
There are several theories of why rape occurs, especially in war zones. Although 
sexual violence’s use as a tool of terror is involved, sexual gratification seems to have been 
the most convincing motivation in the eastern rear areas. Although power (as the traditional 
feminist interpretation of rape) was undoubtedly one facet, it seems strange to equate sexual 
violence with authority in a setting where the victim knew that they could be murdered 
without it being considered a crime.6 Although it would be simplistic and wrong to equate 
sexual violence against both those within and outside the forced servitude of a military 
brothel, the moral obstacle to rape is undoubtedly lowered in a position where the offender 
already controls the life and death of the victim.  
 
Many of the bands that would later be referred to as Soviet partisans spent the first 
chapter of the war as little more than bandits. The entrenchment of the partisan’s 
unpunishable authority only legitimized and exacerbated this heritage. Just as for the German 
invaders, looting was justified as an extension of the partisan’s need to live off the civilian 
populace. In the words of one partisan survivor, the total looting of the civilian population 
was done in full knowledge of Soviet high command with the presumption that anything that 
the Soviets did not take would just be left for the Germans.7 In this way, even the most 
defenceless of the civilian population were weaponised against the invader, with their 
perpetual poverty adding to the inhospitality of the land. Just as with the host of preconditions 
discussed earlier in this essay, the leeway afforded to a partisan that is able to requisition 
material at their own discretion encouraged the wholesale stripping of a victim's possessions. 
Emboldened, often drunk partisans requisitioned without limit, commonly taking things that 
seemed to be of no use to them. There are many cases similar to these, but a simple trend 
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emerges in instances where a woman's lingerie is demanded by male fighters, or a child's only 
winter jacket is stolen.8 Partisans soon resembled gangsters, operating behind the officially-
mandated racket of wartime resistance.  
 
For many, life as a partisan was greatly motivated as a chance for life at all. The 
broken remnants of destroyed villages, in a country sundered by an exterminationist 
occupation and civil war, had to seize what chances they could to survive. In many cases, 
robbery of this kind to have been motivated by something other than survival, such as a 
chance to wield power over a defenceless other. However, one can imagine that someone 
fleeing a burning home could take what opportunities arose to emerge out of the war with 
some semblance of their pre-war wealth. One partisan veteran recalls selling salt on the black 
market after being drafted into the Red Army at many times its usual value.9 It seems that 
many in this way were simply attempting to salvage the livelihoods that had been sacrificed 
or lost during the fighting. Attempting to understand this phenomena in this way does not 
deserve to detract from the overwhelming condemnation that many of the partisans earned by 
stripping the population’s necessities. 
Partisans were similarly able to murder civilians at will, often accompanying the 
many other instances of robbery and rape. As has been established, partisans were provided a 
mechanism that allowed the execution of civilians to be legitimised and accepted as a 
contribution to the war. This ability was soon to be severely exploited as an individualistic, 
opportunistic method of coercion and punishment. Historian Alexander Brakel details the 
great many examples of murder in the National Archive of Belarus. In one instance, a village 
had become a nightly raiding ground of the local partisan band. A resident farmer was 
demanded for vodka and was shot in the head while he explained that he had none. In a 
similar case, a partisan attempted to rape the female maidservant of a property while his 
accomplice executed a local farm boy that had stood up to them in her defence.10 The term 
“collaborator” was applied without deliberation, such as with civilians simply tilling their 
own fields being considered as working with the enemy and promptly being executed.11 
Slepyan provides another telling example of the looseness of the term “collaborator” from the 
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. In this case, a partisan’s robbery of a family 
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ended with the murder of the father. To justify the action, this man was quickly identified as 
“an alien element to Soviet power”.12 
At the same time, partisans murdered one another, with partisan bands developing 
regional rivalries. This killing was not wholly beyond the existing nature of the conflict, with 
the Central Staff readily able to mark partisan bands for destruction if their loyalty was 
suspect. Partisan leaders were openly murdered or befell “accidental” deaths at the hands of 
their rivals’ agents.13 Much of the violence of inter-partisan conflict appears to have lessened 
with the creation of the Central Staff in May 1942. Even once the Central Staff had been 
convened, however, partisan rivalries were still able to go unpunished. One partisan veteran, 
introduced earlier in this essay, Joseph Elman, explains one instance whereby partisans were 
killed and looted for valuables from another local group. This crime was reported to the 
authorities later in the war, though no action was taken. The way that Elman recalls the 
response of the authorities gives the impression that this sort of murder can considered to be 
an unfortunate side effect of a partisan war. This was a necessary evil to defeat the invaders. 
Certainly, it would likely be very difficult to find whoever was responsible for these murders, 
but the authorities’ response still sheds light on the nature of the conflict.14 
Partisans enacted sexual violence on the occupied civilian population, as well within 
as their own ranks. Women formed roughly five percent of some partisan bands, with the 
highest estimates reaching just over nine percent of the movement by the end of the war.15 
Although Eisa Shor, a partisan veteran from the majority-Jewish Bielski band, recalls that she 
was not discriminated against for being a woman in a partisan detachment, she does note that 
she had to work to establish her value on military operations.16 In other bands, however, 
women were commonly addressed simply as “whore” or as “camp partisan wives”. Women 
often had to seek a male protector or were considered as the valued property of male fighters 
whose rank determined the number of women that they perceived rights to.17 The lack of 
restraint that partisans enjoyed within their own ranks mirrors their dealings with civilians, 
such as in one instance where a partisan woman was executed as a spy by the unit’s NKVD 
head after she refused his advances. This was not an isolated phenomenon, with camp women 
risking rape or death for their defiance.18 In discussing the motivations of rape on the Eastern 
Front, historian Wendy Jo Gertjejanssen posits that rape occurred as a result of the 
                                                     
12 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 140. 
13 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 106, 178. 
14 Elman, Interview. 
15 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 195. 
16 Shor, Interview.  
17 Snyder, Bloodlands, 239; Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 195. 
18 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 195. 
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perpetrator’s negative attitude towards women, as well as their belief in their right to the 
victim’s bodies, among other reasons.19 I would argue that Gertjejanssen is essentially correct, 
though with the added layer that many of these victims were of the occupied people, and thus 
inhabited a lower rung of moral consideration and obligation in the minds of both the German 
and Soviet perpetrators. 
The nature of the rear-area security war was such that the robbery, rape and murder of 
a civilian could easily go unpunished. Simultaneously, looting, violence and killing were 
often rewarded with the recognition of a successful mission. The occupied territories, in this 
way, became a space within which any action was permissible against the civilian population. 
Any level of brutality or exploitation could be employed against them. Above all, these 
actions were conceived to be legitimate acts of war against an enemy population. Substance-
abuse had become a powerful tool to help one survive the frontlines. As a result, alcohol 
fuelled fighters’ crimes and the states that had created these conditions were either unwilling 
or unable to alleviate them. Certainly, not every fighter in the rear area treated civilians in this 
way. However, this behaviour was not perpetrated by a diminutive few. Exploitation of the 
occupied civilians was extremely common and therefore represents a pervasive mentality in 
the rear areas. It is significant that a conclusion on these actions can be discussed without 
specific reference to either the German counterinsurgency forces or the Soviet partisans. Both 
forces perpetrated these crimes in very comparable ways, as a result of very comparable 
influences. This leads us to the final chapter, within which we will consider the implications 














                                                     





To have … testimony … of a moral blindness that afforded men (and the occasional 
woman) to see repugnant acts without recognizing them as such - this is a challenge 
to what we fervently wish to hold self-evidently true: that human beings are capable 
of distinguishing between right and wrong.1  
This statement was originally intended to explain significance of the Wehrmacht’s role in the 
Holocaust, though it is largely as true for the Soviet partisans as it is for them. Similarly, what 
Michael Geyer refers to as the “profound disablement of moral judgement”2 displayed by the 
Wehrmacht is also resoundingly true for many Soviet partisans. Disablement is a horrifically 
apt word for this phenomena as the regimes that each force claimed loyalty to intentionally 
and mercilessly undermined the legal, moral and psychological restraints that would have 
otherwise curbed the nature of the rear-area security war. In this way, the security war showed 
that moral judgement, the human ability to distinguish between right and wrong, was able to 
be nullified by outside influences. The efforts of the Nazi and Soviet leadership to radicalise 
the war on the frontlines destroyed any resemblance that the war could have had to the 
international norms of war. What was considered as a legitimate war aim, or a legitimate 
target, was broadened to include even the most heinous acts against utterly defenceless 
targets. This radicalisation compounded with the intrinsic forms of the two regimes. Nazi 
racial theory cemented with the traditions of the German army to view the occupied eastern 
civilians as possessing a racially-determined criminality. The harsh German anti-partisan 
doctrine reinforced this ideology, calling for extreme violence for the slightest provocation. 
The Soviet crime and punishment system similarly discouraged mercy against the occupied 
civilians, allowing punishments to be meted out without any justification. The final source of 
the rear-area’s lawlessness was the state’s inability to punish individualistic crimes when they 
did occur. The war had descended to such a depraved pitch that violence of passion and greed 
could not be distinguished from the fighting of the enemy. 
Once lawlessness had been created, both the German counterinsurgency forces and 
the Soviet partisans used their freedom to exploit the occupied civilians. In this way, a look at 
a relatively limited set of examples shows a convergence of the two rival forces. This 
                                                     
1 Michael Geyer, “Foreword,” in The German Army and Genocide, Crimes Against Prisoners, Jews, 
and Other Civilians, 1939-1944, ed. The Hamburg Institute for Social Research (New York, The New 
Press, 1999), 8. 
2 Geyer, “Foreword,” 8. 
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convergence is almost total, being visible on nearly every level of the security war’s official 
and unofficial conduct. As a result, convergence seems to wholly eclipse any other 
observation on the civilian’s experience in the occupied Soviet territories. Convergence 
certainly has been discussed by historians in the past. However, the extent to which it 
occurred appears to have been only suggested implicitly, whereas it needs to be stated 
explicitly.  
There was one key difference between the forces of the security war that must not be 
overshadowed by their comparisons. The German counterinsurgency campaign was a pivotal 
part of the Holocaust. While both forces of the security war conceived of the civilians as 
disposable, Jewish civilians were more than disposable for the German forces; they were 
marked for death.3 Jews were consistently selected over others as the targets of reprisals and 
collective punishments as a result of this distinction.4 The convergence of the security war 
tactics, in light of their significance to the Holocaust, should encourage further contemplation 
by historians of the partisan movement. This should not lessen the horror of the Holocaust by 
relativisation, nor should it be pursued without an acknowledgement of the nuanced 
differences between the two forces’ tactics. 
Despite the comparison between the forces of the security war being open in the 
recollections of contemporary observers,5 the lack of explicit discussion of their convergence 
seems to be a result of the conflict’s historiography. It might be that the sense of caution and 
sensitivity that historians approach the study of the Holocaust with has also played a part in 
the security war’s study. The complex issues of morality that were generated by the 
Historikerstreit, the aforementioned “historians’ dispute”, may have dissuaded historians 
from making what has been a politically-loaded comparison in the past. This is the 
observation from a student that began their studies long after the Historikerstreit had 
subsided, though this dispute seems to be a reasonable origin if my understanding of the 
historiography is correct. There are still valuable lessons to learn from a comparison of the 
two forces. That two seemingly-dichotomous groups, fighting under the banner of two 
seemingly-opposite states, could have acted in the same way against the occupied civilians 
begs further inquiry. When questioned, the face-value differences between the two forces and 
their states gives way to similarities between the ways that they each conceptualised 
themselves and their victims. 
                                                     
3 A distinction eloquently made by Geyer, “Foreword”, 8, 9. 
4 Shepherd, “The Clean Wehrmacht,” 459. 
5 See Elman, Interview. Elman refers to the occupied civilians as “caught in between” the forces of the 
two states, for just one example. 
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Similarly, this argument has powerful implications for the politics of memory in the 
post-Soviet countries. It is here that memory disputes have arisen regarding the groups that 
collaborated with the Germans or committed similar actions to them, such as in Ukraine with 
the UPA and with the Soviet partisans themselves in Russia and Belarus. The trend of 
misrepresenting the various guerrilla and partisan groups continue to this day, with 
government decrees in Russia and Ukraine that inhibit these countries from coming to terms 
with the past. This thesis has not covered the other guerrilla groups of the Eastern Front, 
though it seems as though their histories will also share similarities those explored here. 
Without critical reflection on the part of the post-Soviet countries themselves, true 
acknowledgement of the realities of the war, still obscured seventy years on, cannot be 
achieved. A new Vergangenheitsbewältigung, a coming-to-terms-with-the-past, for those that 
inherited the Soviet partisans’ legacy will not be completed while the remaining archives on 
this topic stay inaccessible. 
Finally, despite the potential hopelessness that any morality can withstand the moral 
disablement of such a time and place as the occupied USSR during the Second World War, 
we must remind ourselves that some glimmer of innocence did survive the war. Kenneth 
Slepyan provides a heartening excerpt from the Russian State Archives. This radio message 
was presented to partisans, ranging from children to the elderly, men and women, that were 
defending their village on 28 June 1942: 
Patriotism begins from the most ordinary: from the tree next to the house, from the 
lane running down the river with the smell of antonovka apples or the steppe fields. 
The war helps every Soviet person understand the beauty of his native place.6 
Even despite its ideological frame, excerpts like this must be remembered to avoid wholesale 
condemnation of the partisan movement. There were many people on the Eastern Front that 
became classed as collaborators or partisans by circumstance alone. Many of these shared the 
simple desires for life, peace and home. Even those that brutalised their former neighbours 
can be seen as victims of a war that they did not ask for. This essay began with the insight 
from A. C. Grayling that war creates a moral space beyond the realms of everyday human 
life. The occupied civilians saw their homes transformed into a literal space beyond morality, 
where they were not only victims of it but were encouraged to participate. For those that did 
take part in the violence, however, the terrifying conclusion remains: the only thing that was 
able to restrain the fighters in the east was themselves, and overwhelmingly, they did not. 
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